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967 
THE RETURN OF THE TECHNICAL MCDONNELL 
DOUGLAS PARADIGM 
Katie Eyer* 
Abstract: For many anti-discrimination plaintiffs, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm will 
determine the success or failure of their claims. And yet, for decades, most lower courts have 
applied a technical version of McDonnell Douglas—under which plaintiffs invariably lose. 
Thus, instead of asking the factual question of whether the defendant’s action was “because 
of” protected class status, the lower courts rely on a host of technical rules to dismiss even 
factually strong anti-discrimination claims. 
This is not the first time the lower courts have attempted to adopt a technical version of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm. In the 1970s and 1980s, the lower courts applied similar 
technical rules—but to the disadvantage of discrimination defendants, not plaintiffs. Across a 
series of cases, the United States Supreme Court rejected these technical rules, reasoning that 
it is ultimately the factual question of discrimination that must control. Thus, the Supreme 
Court has already determined that it is the factual question of discrimination—rather than any 
technical rules engrafted by the lower courts on McDonnell Douglas—that must be dispositive 
in a discrimination case. 
This history should have profound implications for the practice of anti-discrimination law 
today. The lower courts’ technical approach to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm represents 
one of the most significant and pervasive obstacles to contemporary anti-discrimination 
enforcement. And yet, it is plainly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s existing case law. 
Remembering this history—and recognizing its significance—offers one of the most realistic 
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INTRODUCTION 
The McDonnell Douglas paradigm is ubiquitous in modern anti-
discrimination law. In the employment discrimination arena, more than 
90% of cases exclusively raise claims of individual disparate treatment—
and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm is the predominant 
way of proving such claims.1 Areas such as housing discrimination, public 
accommodations discrimination, discrimination in government programs, 
and even Equal Protection claims are also often evaluated by the lower 
courts via the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.2 Thus, the paradigm’s 
familiar three-step approach—prima facie case, “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason,” pretext/ultimate issue of discrimination—
pervades virtually every corner of anti-discrimination law.3 If the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm is broken, anti-discrimination law itself is in trouble. 
                                                     
1. See ELLEN BERREY, ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 57–58 (2017); Michael J. Hayes, That Pernicious Pop-up, the Prima 
Facie Case, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 343, 343 (2006); see also Jessica Clarke, Protected Class 
Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 102 (2017).  
2. See, e.g., Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014) (Title VI, federally 
funded programs); Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009) (housing under the FHA); 
Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Services, 551 F.3d 344, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2008) (public accommodations 
under Title II); Harper v. Madison Metropolitan School Dist. 110 F. App’x 684, 686–87 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Equal Protection claims).  
3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1972). For a more extensive 
discussion of the steps of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm and how they operate, see infra Part I. 
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And indeed, scholars have argued for years that the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm has become deeply flawed.4 Relying on a hyper-
technical version of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the lower courts5 
routinely refuse to allow discrimination cases to reach a jury.6 Such 
analyses rarely focus on the factual question of whether or not 
discrimination occurred, substituting technical rules for fair consideration 
of whether discrimination took place (or whether a reasonable jury could 
so conclude).7 Although the McDonnell Douglas paradigm is supposed to 
be a procedural vehicle—intended merely to assist the fact-finder in 
answering the factual question of discrimination—its associated legal 
rules are treated instead as a substantive basis to dismiss claims.8 Through 
this case-by-case application of the technical McDonnell Douglas 
                                                     
4. See, e.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS 
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 116–23 (2017) (describing the variety of problems with how the 
McDonnell Douglas test is applied, including the fact that it “may be  used to dismiss” plaintiffs’ 
claims via a variety of technical rules); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting 
Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 752–53, 761 (1995); 
Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 
2280–81, 2301 (1995); Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger of Practicing Law as 
Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 160–61, 180–85 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and 
the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. 
L. REV. 203, 229–30 (1993); Steven R. Semler, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 49, 49–51, 82–85 
(2014); see also infra notes 13 & 57–66; see generally SANDRA F. SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE 
MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 321–22 (2018) (collecting critiques). 
5. Not all lower court judges take this type of technical approach. Indeed, some lower court 
judges—both liberal and conservative—have offered strong critiques of the application of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm in this fashion or, more fundamentally, of the paradigm itself. See, e.g., 
Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1210–12, 1214 (10th Cir. 2016); Coleman v. Doahoe, 667 F.3d 
835, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring); Deny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Beyond McDonnell 
Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 
659, 621–22, 672 (1998); Hon. David F. Hamilton, Address to the AALS Section on Employment 
Discrimination Law, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 195, 197–98 (2013); Hon. Timothy M. 
Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503, 522, 528–29 (2008). Nevertheless, 
it remains a common approach in the lower courts. See supra note 4; infra note 67. When I refer to 
the “lower courts” herein, I am referring to the general trend in the lower courts, rather than claiming 
that every lower court judge adheres to a technical rigid approach to the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm—some do not. 
6. See sources cited supra note 4; infra note 10; infra notes 57–67 (describing the difficulties 
McDonnell Douglas plaintiffs face in getting to a jury); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing 
of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001) (discussing “slicing and dicing” 
of discrimination claims). 
7. See sources cited supra notes 4–5; see also SPERINO, supra note 4, at 320–21 (describing one 
federal judge’s critique of the application of McDonnell Douglas as having become focused on 
technical rules rather than on the ultimate question of discrimination). 
8. See sources cited supra note 7; see also Malamud, supra note 4, at 2273–74; Semler, supra note 
4, at 87–88. 
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paradigm,9 the lower courts have effectuated a quiet revolution in anti-
discrimination law, rendering it very difficult for victims of discrimination 
to seek relief.10 
Unlike a high-profile United States Supreme Court decision, this quiet 
revolution has not resulted in extensive media coverage nor in successful 
calls for a Congressional override.11 The myriad legal rules that comprise 
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm—rigid formulations of the 
prima facie case, demands for “nearly identical” comparators, doctrines 
like the stray remarks doctrine, honest good faith belief rule, and others—
are not headline-grabbing and largely have not permeated the public 
consciousness.12 And while scholars have recognized the problem, most 
of the solutions they have suggested, including abandonment of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, do not appear imminent.13 Thus, even as 
the application of technical legal rules via the McDonnell Douglas 
                                                     
9. I use the term “the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm” throughout this piece to signify 
judicial approaches that permit the legal rules engrafted on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm to 
supersede the factual question of whether disparate treatment took place. So understood, one critique of the 
argument herein (that such approaches must be rejected) might be that it renders the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm essentially irrelevant, since its rules may never supersede the factual question of discrimination.  
This is accurate. But it is the Supreme Court that has held (in the context of defendants) that the 
factual question of discrimination must at all times remain dispositive in a McDonnell Douglas case, 
regardless of the its legal framework. Thus, if there is an objection to the treatment of the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm as mere window dressing, it is one that arises from the Supreme Court’s existing 
reasoning, not the even-handed application of that reasoning to defendants and plaintiffs alike.  
10. See sources cited supra note 4; infra note 55; see generally Katie Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: 
American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 (2012) 
(describing the very low litigation success rates of discrimination plaintiffs generally). 
11. Cf. McGinley, supra note 4, at 203–06 (contrasting the lack of public attention to the misuse of 
summary judgment—a problem Professor McGinley presciently attributed to misapplication of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm—with the substantial attention paid to certain Congressionally 
overridden Supreme Court decisions). 
12. The doctrines listed here are just a few examples of the wide variety of technical legal rules that 
the lower courts apply. See Part I, infra for a more extensive discussion. 
13. Professor Sandra Sperino has been among the most long-standing and thoughtful critics of the 
operation of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, suggesting a variety of ways to eliminate or limit its 
harmful effects on anti-discrimination law. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 332–34; Sandra 
Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 270–71 (2013); Sandra 
Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas is Not Justified by Any Statutory 
Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 801–05 (2006); Sandra Sperino, Rethinking 
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 87–90, 115–24 (2011). My argument herein offers a new 
angle on an old problem but should be seen as fully consonant with the prior work of Sperino and 
other scholars and judges calling for the paradigm’s abandonment or limitation. For other scholars 
and judges calling for the paradigm’s abandonment, see, for example, Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 
835, 862–863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring); Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 672; Davis, 
supra note 4, at 761; Malamud, supra note 4, at 2236–38, 2317–20; McCormick, supra note 4, at 191; 
Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie 
Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 398 (1997); Tymkovich, supra note 5, at 528–29. 
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paradigm continues to widely disadvantage discrimination plaintiffs in the 
lower courts, it is far from clear that a solution is at hand. 
This Article suggests that a solution to this common problem exists—
and indeed has been hiding in plain sight in the history of the Supreme 
Court’s McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence. This is not the first time that 
the lower courts have attempted to impose technical legal rules under the 
rubric of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.14 And, the Supreme Court 
amply considered—and rejected—such a technical approach.15 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court made clear across a series of cases that it 
is the factual question of discrimination that must control the outcome of 
McDonnell Douglas cases, rather than any technical rules the lower courts 
may adopt.16 Under the Supreme Court’s doctrine, the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm is simply a “procedural device”—one which may aid 
in considering the factual question of discrimination, but that does not 
(and cannot) supplant the fundamentally factual question that the federal 
anti-discrimination laws ask.17 
Of course, the lower courts’ first attempt to impose technical rules via 
McDonnell Douglas largely burdened discrimination defendants, not 
discrimination plaintiffs.18 Unlike today, where it is plaintiffs whose 
factually viable claims are rejected based on technical legal rules, 
discrimination defendants were historically the party that saw their factual 
arguments subordinated to technical legal rules. Perhaps for this reason, 
the Supreme Court’s decisions rejecting the first “technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm” have not been generally treated as relevant to the 
contemporary problem of plaintiff-disadvantaging technical McDonnell 
Douglas approaches.19 But examination of the history of these earlier 
cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court considered virtually identical 
arguments, in the context of very similar technical rules, and decided 
decisively in favor of a factually (not technically) focused McDonnell 
Douglas approach.20 
This insight should have profound implications for the practice of anti-
discrimination law today. Taking seriously the history of the first 
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm—and the rationales on which it 
                                                     
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See St. Mary’s Honor v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518–21 (1993). 
18. Id. 
19. See generally sources cited supra note 4 (not extensively focusing on the Supreme Court’s prior 
McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence as foreclosing the lower courts’ technical anti-plaintiff rules). 
20. See infra Part II. 
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was rejected—broad swaths of the plaintiff-unfavorable doctrine in the 
lower courts ought to be deemed illegitimate.21 Moreover, rather than 
fighting against an endless succession of technical—and individually 
seemingly trivial—judicial moves, discrimination plaintiffs can (and 
should) focus their attention on the categorical illegitimacy of the technical 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm.22 Instead of technical rules, the outcome of 
each McDonnell Douglas case should ultimately turn on a factual question: 
whether the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination (or, in the case of 
summary judgment, whether a reasonable jury could so conclude). 
The time is ripe for this type of major rethinking of the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm. As scholars such as Professor Sandra Sperino have 
pointed out, critiques of the technical aspects of the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm are already extant among some lower court judges.23 Indeed, a 
few circuits have already adopted alternatives designed to ensure that 
ultimately the factual question of discrimination is not lost.24 Therefore, 
some lower court case law already embraces the perspective that the 
technical McDonnell Douglas is problematic—and may offer models for 
how to practically ensure that the factual question of discrimination 
remains dispositive.25 
Eliminating the lower courts’ technical approach to the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm would not remove all of the many obstacles that exist 
to anti-discrimination enforcement.26 But such a move could nevertheless 
have a substantial impact on plaintiffs’ ability to successfully bring anti-
discrimination claims. Currently, an immense number of discrimination 
cases are dismissed by judges at summary judgment based on the 
application of technical rules associated with the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm.27 Such judgments are justified by technical legal rules that have 
little relationship to the factual question of whether discrimination 
actually took place.28 While some such cases would not survive summary 
                                                     
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See SPERINO, supra note 4, at 317–21. 
24. Id. at 330–32. 
25. Id. Note also, however, that experience with these lower court approaches also suggests how 
“sticky” technical McDonnell Douglas rules can be, carrying over even to frameworks nominally 
adopted to correct for the courts’ inappropriately technical focus under McDonnell Douglas. See infra 
notes 267–269 and accompanying text. 
26. As the extensive literature on this subject confirms, there are many other potential barriers to 
discrimination plaintiffs’ success. For my prior work on other obstacles that employment 
discrimination attorneys may face, see, for example, Eyer, supra note 10, at 1276–79.  
27. See sources cited infra note 55.  
28. See infra Part I. 
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judgment even if the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm were 
eliminated, others surely would.29 And, given the very large number of 
plaintiffs adversely affected by the lower courts’ technical approach to the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, even a modest change in how judges decided 
dispositive motions could meaningfully affect civil rights enforcement.30 
Moreover, eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
would also increase transparency in ways that could promote more 
profound shifts in anti-discrimination advocacy and attitudes. Currently, 
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm serves to obscure the courts’ 
pervasive defendant-favorable normative judgments by hiding what is a 
fundamentally value-laden judgment—that no reasonable jury could 
conclude that discrimination took place—behind a series of technical 
moves.31 This technical façade makes it enormously challenging to 
mobilize the moral concern necessary to shift public and judicial 
perceptions about (non-)existence of discrimination and the inadequacy 
of legal remedies to address it. Addressing the technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm would make plain the normative choices that courts are 
making and thus aid in the broader (and fundamentally more important) 
project of shifting public and judicial views regarding the adequacy of 
anti-discrimination enforcement today.32 In short, while eliminating the 
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm would not eradicate all of anti-
discrimination law’s limitations, it would mark an important step toward 
meaningful reform. 
The foregoing issues are addressed by this Article in three Parts. Part I 
introduces the reader to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm and explains 
why its technical application has rendered it a central obstacle to the 
effective implementation of anti-discrimination law today. Part II turns to 
the prior defendant-disadvantaging version of the technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm and its consideration by the Supreme Court. As this 
Part describes, in this context the Supreme Court fully considered—and 
rejected—the rationales that undergird the revival of the modern technical 
McDonnell Douglas. Finally, Part III describes the implications of this 
history and suggests that taking seriously the denouement of the first 
                                                     
29. For several examples, see, for example, the cases discussed infra notes 77–89 and 
accompanying text. 
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
31. See supra Part I. 
32. Shifting such views is obviously critical to successful policy reform—but there are reasons to 
think that it may also be important to individual case outcomes. Cf. Eyer, supra note 10, at 1315–17 
(describing how background beliefs about the commonality of discrimination can affect perceptions 
of the likelihood of discrimination in individual cases). 
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technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm may hold the key to one of the most 
important opportunities for contemporary anti-discrimination reform. 
I. THE TECHNICAL MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM AND 
THE FAILINGS OF MODERN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
When the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was first adopted in the 
eponymous case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 it was not 
immediately clear how ubiquitous—and problematic—it would 
eventually prove for anti-discrimination law. As one of the first Title VII 
cases to address an individual disparate treatment claim, McDonnell 
Douglas articulated the now-familiar three-step burden-shifting framework 
through which most modern disparate treatment plaintiffs bring their claims. 
First, the plaintiff has to prove a simple “prima facie case,” which the 
McDonnell Douglas Court held could be done by showing “(i) that [the 
plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his 
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of [the plaintiff’s] qualifications.”34 
Next, the defendant comes forward with a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” (LNDR), for instance, a reason that is not 
discrimination for the adverse employment action.35 
And finally, the Plaintiff must be given the opportunity to show that the 
                                                     
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
34. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This formulation of the prima facie case could not 
possibly apply in all discrimination cases, since it is, for example, facially inapplicable to firing cases. 
All of the circuits have recognized this, though they have responded differently. Some circuits have 
adopted different versions of the prima facie case for different contexts, while others have articulated 
a generalized version of the prima facie case. Compare Muhammed v. Sills Cummis & Gross, P.C., 
621 F. App’x 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 2015) (providing specific—and different—requirements for 
plaintiffs seeking to prove a prima facie case in the termination and reduction in force contexts), with 
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating the prima facie 
case in general terms as requiring a showing that the plaintiff (i) belongs to a protected class; (ii) is 
qualified; (iii) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (iv) under circumstances that give 
rise to an inference of discrimination). As noted infra, some courts apply their circuit’s particular 
formulations of the prima facie case rigidly, as if they set out the legal elements of a discrimination 
claim and will dismiss cases based on a failure to meet the specific requirements stated in circuit case 
law. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.  
35. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03. Later cases have made clear that this reason need not 
be truly “legitimate”—it can be illegal, and even discriminatory, so long as it is not the specific type 
of discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 611–12 
(1993) (acknowledging that language in McDonnell Douglas can be taken to mean that the employer 
must produce a truly “legitimate” reason at Step Two, for example, one that at a minimum is not 
illegal, but finding that this reading “is obviously incorrect”). 
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Defendant’s reason was pretextual (i.e., false) and that the real reason was 
discrimination.36 
As we approach the fifty-year anniversary of the doctrine, the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm has been aptly described by Professor 
Sandra Sperino as “the Most Important Case in Employment 
Discrimination Law.”37 A tremendous number of plaintiffs bring their 
claims via the McDonnell Douglas paradigm—more than via any other 
anti-discrimination paradigm.38 Reflecting its outsized dominance, 
McDonnell Douglas is the thirteenth most cited Supreme Court case of all 
time—cited 58,073 times in subsequent cases.39 (In contrast, Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.,40 the foundational case for disparate impact doctrine, has been 
cited a mere 3,400 times in subsequent case law.)41 Many administrative civil 
rights agencies also rely on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm to adjudicate 
claims, further expanding the reach of its influence.42 
                                                     
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–05. The courts’ use of the term “pretext” has been 
inconsistent over the years, with the courts sometimes using the term to mean essentially all evidence 
of discrimination and at other times using the term to mean only “falsity” of the employer’s LNDR. 
Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05 (apparently using the term to connote all evidence 
of discrimination), with St. Mary’s Honor v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993) (treating pretext as 
connoting only the falsity of the employer’s reason). At this juncture, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
have made clear that it views the term “pretext” as connoting “falsity”—which, the Court has held, is 
sufficient to prove discrimination but does not require a finding of discrimination. See St. Mary’s 
Honor, 509 U.S. at 510–11; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000). The Court 
has also made clear that it is discrimination, rather than pretext, that is the plaintiff’s required showing 
at Step Three—although, as described infra, some courts continue to erroneously impose on plaintiff’s 
a requirement that the plaintiff show pretext in the sense of falsity. See St. Mary’s Honor, 509 U.S. at 
510–11; see also infra note 58 and accompanying text. I use the term “pretext” herein as the Supreme 
Court has clarified its usage today—to connote proof of falsity of the employer’s LNDR. 
37. See generally SPERINO, supra note 4. 
38. See sources cited supra note 1.  
39. See Westlaw citing references for McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1972) 
(current as of Jan. 25, 2019). See also Lauren Mattiuzzo, Most Cited U.S. Supreme Court Cases in 
Hein Online: Part III, https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2018/09/most-cited-u-s-supreme-court-
cases-in-heinonline-part-iii/ [https://perma.cc/9WHJ-GHPA] (as of 2018, listing McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green as the thirteenth most cited Supreme Court case). 
40. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
41. See Westlaw citing references for Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (current as 
of Jan. 25, 2019). 
42. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Marilyn Frisbee, HUDALJ No. 07-91-0027-1, 
at *6 (May 6, 1992), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD-07-91-0027-1.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/6YFY-4922 ] (noting that the chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of Housing 
Urban Development (HUD) adopted the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in Fair Housing Act cases, an 
approach that was affirmed in the courts); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., TITLE VI 
LEGAL MANUAL, ch. 6, (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/934826/download 
[https://perma.cc/RX5L-2RCA] (as part of the Department of Justice’s responsibility for coordinating 
agency enforcement efforts under Title VI, discussing the McDonnell Douglas framework as a means 
of proving intentional discrimination, though noting that agencies are not bound by case law 
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This outsized significance of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm renders 
it highly important to the overall success of the contemporary anti-
discrimination project. Because employment discrimination plaintiffs—
and, to a lesser extent, housing, government services, and public 
accommodations plaintiffs—primarily bring their claims via the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, problems with that paradigm impact an 
enormous number of cases.43 To the extent that the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm has been transformed into an obstacle to anti-discrimination 
plaintiffs, rather than an aid, that problem strikes at the very core of anti-
discrimination enforcement.44 
As set out in the following Part, anti-discrimination plaintiffs—and 
organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) that represent 
them—originally did not see the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as an 
impediment to their success.45 To the contrary, aided by a set of anti-
defendant technical rules adopted by the lower courts, anti-discrimination 
advocates originally perceived the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a 
doctrine of key importance for plaintiffs with only circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination.46 For this reason, the LDF and other 
progressive actors fought hard to keep the McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
and the pro-plaintiff technical rules that the lower courts originally 
engrafted on it.47 
But while the Supreme Court kept the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, 
it largely rejected the technical pro-plaintiff rules that the lower courts had 
originally attached to it.48 By 1993, with the case of St. Mary’s Honor v. 
                                                     
interpreting the framework). As Professor Sperino has noted, states also often apply McDonnell 
Douglas under their state anti-discrimination laws, albeit sometimes in ways that differ materially 
from the federal application of the test. See SPERINO, supra note 4, at 311–16. 
43. See sources cited supra notes 1–2. 
44. Id. 
45. See infra Part II. 
46. See infra Part II. 
47. See infra Part II. 
48. See infra Part II. The one notable exception to this is that some lower courts will treat pleading 
of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case as sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss, even though 
pleading such a prima facie case is not required. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 296. It is not 
clear if the Supreme Court would agree with this approach. The primary other rule that remains that 
benefits plaintiffs under McDonnell Douglas is that pretext can be a sufficient basis for a fact-finder 
to find discrimination—but the Supreme Court has made clear that that rule is not a technical one, but 
simply a matter of the common-sense factual inferences that can be made in any legal context where 
a party lies. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 147–48 (2000). Finally, the 
requirement that a defendant come forward with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason has little 
meaning in view of liberal discovery rules—and courts virtually never award judgment to plaintiffs 
on that basis. See SPERINO, supra note 4, at 101; Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 665–68 (as of 
1998—twenty-five years after the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was created—finding that there “is 
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Hicks,49 the Supreme Court had mostly dismantled those technical aspects 
of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm that favored plaintiffs.50 And while 
the Court’s reasoning appeared to require a doctrine that did not favor 
either party, the lower courts quickly adopted new technical rules—now 
disadvantaging discrimination plaintiffs.51 
Today, the application of technical reasoning under the rubric of 
McDonnell Douglas to dismiss discrimination plaintiffs’ claims is one of 
the most pervasive problems faced by those seeking to enforce the anti-
discrimination laws.52 It has become commonplace for the lower courts to 
“slice and dice” anti-discrimination plaintiffs’ evidence and to order 
dismissal of claims on improbably technical grounds.53 These technical 
glosses on McDonnell Douglas can take a wide variety of forms—and 
multiple glosses or techniques are often deployed in the course of 
rejecting a plaintiff’s claims.54 Each year, scores of cases are dismissed by 
judges relying on this hyper-technical version of the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm.55 Indeed, the “technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm” is 
                                                     
not a single reported case in which a plaintiff prevails at the second step” because of an employer’s 
inability or unwillingness to come forward with an LNDR). But cf. Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 
1078, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that the employer had failed to meet their step-two burden 
and that if the plaintiff proved a prima facie case on remand, they were entitled to prevail). 
49. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).  
50. See supra note 48. 
51. See Part II. Indeed, already at the time that St. Mary’s Honor was decided, the lower courts had 
begun to apply it in a technical, plaintiff-unfavorable way. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 229 (writing 
just prior to St. Mary’s Honor, noting that the lower courts were using the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm to defeat plaintiffs’ claims at summary judgment). 
52. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
53. The concept of “slicing and dicing” is one that I borrow from other anti-discrimination law 
scholars, who have long critiqued the phenomenon of “slicing and dicing” as problematic. See, e.g., 
SPERINO, supra note 4, at 324 (discussing the phenomenon of “slicing and dicing” and describing 
how the McDonnell Douglas paradigm contributes to it); SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 151–
55 (describing “slicing and dicing” and how technical employment discrimination rules contribute to 
it); Zimmer, supra note 6 (original article discussing this phenomenon).  
54. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 85–86 (describing how multiple technical 
doctrines can come together to justify dismissal); see also infra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.  
55. For example, in a recent survey of three months of Court of Appeals decisions invoking the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, fifty-six of sixty-three decisions resulted in a total loss for the 
plaintiff—and in only two cases applying a technical version of McDonnell Douglas did plaintiffs see 
any success. While this is far from a scientific sample, and dismissal may have been proper in some 
cases, it is evident that in many instances application of a technical version of McDonnell Douglas 
resulted in the dismissal of cases in which a reasonable jury could have concluded that discrimination 
occurred. See, e.g., Nzabandora v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia, 749 F. App’x 173, 
175–77 (2018) (affirming an award of summary judgment based on a technical application of 
McDonnell Douglas, including ignoring evidence of discrimination because it was not “direct,” 
applying the “same actor” rule, and treating the pretext determination as dispositive); Plaintiff 
Veronique M. Nzabandora’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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arguably at the very heart of a phenomenon that discrimination scholars 
have rightly decried: judges’ use of summary judgment (and other 
procedural devices) to dismiss many potentially meritorious 
discrimination claims.56 
The various technical arguments relied on by the lower courts are 
familiar to anti-discrimination law practitioners and include things like: 
• rigid application of the prima facie case, for instance, 
treating the components of a particular statement of the 
prima facie case as if they were legal elements;57 
• requiring the plaintiff to show “pretext” in the sense of 
the LNDR’s falsity, even where there is strong 
                                                     
Nzabandora v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia (W.D. Va. 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-3) 
(plaintiff was called inter alia a “stupid African immigrant,” was repeatedly told to drop her 
discrimination complaint, and was directly told “we have fired black people before like you”). The 
vast majority of the cases (sixty of sixty-three) were decided on summary judgment. A search was 
conducted in the Westlaw Federal Courts of Appeals Database, with the following search string: 
“((“mcdonnell douglas” /200 discrim!) (“mcdonnell douglas” /10 green)) and da(aft 9/30/2018 and 
bef 1/1/2019).” 
56. For a remarkably explicit acknowledgment that the courts rely on McDonnell Douglas as a 
basis for awarding summary judgment against plaintiffs, see, for example, Lewis v. City of Union 
City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (rejecting the plaintiff’s proposed standard for 
comparators under McDonnell Douglas partly on the ground that it would not allow sufficient cases 
to be dismissed at summary judgment). For other sources documenting the use of McDonnell Douglas 
at summary judgment to dismiss cases at summary judgment, see, e.g., sources cited supra note 55; 
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 197; McGinley, supra note 4, at 228–42; Malamud, supra note 4, at 2297–
80.  
Note that although jury trials were available early on for age discrimination cases, they only became 
available for most other protected categories with the passage of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1991. 
Because the jury trial right of CRA 1991 was held to only apply prospectively (to conduct post-dating 
the enactment of CRA 1991), such a right became available roughly contemporaneously with the 
demise of the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm (that benefitting defendants) in St. Mary’s 
Honor v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 490, 510–11 (1993); see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280–
81, 286 (1994) (jury trial right of CRA 1991 is prospective only); infra Part II (discussing the demise 
of the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm in St. Mary’s Honor). Thus, awards of summary 
judgment and judgment as a matter of law (JMOL)—devices which take cases away from jury fact-
finders—have marked the primary way that the modern anti-plaintiff technical McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm has been implemented. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 55; Hamilton, supra note 5, at 
197. In contrast, the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm was a set of rules developed by the 
circuit courts primarily to control the conduct of the district courts as fact finders. See infra Part II. 
57. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 97, 133, 135, 145, 150; Clarke, supra note 1, at 116–18; 
Davis, supra note 4, at 753–58; Hayes, supra note 1, at 362–63, 370; Malamud, supra note 4, at 2292–
94, 2296–98; McCormick, supra note 4, at 185; Semler, supra note 4, at 73; Smith, supra note 13, at 
374. Many Supreme Court cases directly repudiate this approach. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996); 
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54, 253 n.6 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576–77 (1978); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357–
58 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976); McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973); SPERINO, supra note 4 (making this observation). 
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affirmative evidence of discrimination58; 
• the stray remarks doctrine, under which discriminatory 
comments that are not directly related to the decision, or not 
made by a decision-maker, or distant in time, are ignored59; 
• the honest-belief rule, under which employers whose 
articulated LNDR is factually false must nevertheless be 
absolved if (in the court’s view) the decisionmaker 
honestly believed the LNDR to be true at the time60; 
• the same-actor inference, which holds that there is a strong 
inference—perhaps conclusive—that discrimination did not 
take place where the same person hired and fired the plaintiff61; 
• requirements that the plaintiff identify a “nearly 
identical” comparator to prove discrimination, either as 
part of the prima facie case or in order to prove pretext62; 
• categorical rejection of the plaintiff’s “subjective belief” 
                                                     
58. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 164; Semler, supra note 4, at 50, 64–68. For Supreme Court 
cases holding to the contrary, see, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282 n.10 (specifically noting that the 
plaintiff need not prove that the alleged reason was not a real reason, just that protected class status 
was a “but for” cause); St. Mary’s Honor v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (holding that it is the factual 
question of discrimination, not pretext, which is the ultimate inquiry in a McDonnell Douglas case); 
see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807 (making clear there are many ways plaintiffs can meet 
their burden at Step Three, which are not limited to falsity of the LNDR, and include affirmative 
evidence of discrimination); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (observing that a plaintiff can prevail at Step 
Three “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence”) (emphasis added); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187–88 (1989) 
(emphasizing the variety of ways a plaintiff can meet her Step Three burden, not all of which are 
focused on the falsity of the LNDR, and which can include affirmative evidence of discrimination). 
59.  See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 204–09; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 60–69; 
Jessica Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 540–47 (2018); Natasha Martin, Pretext in 
Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 347–51 (2010); Semler, supra note 4, at 72. For contrary Supreme Court 
cases, see, for example, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 152–53 (2000) 
(reversing a lower court decision that had applied the stray remarks doctrine to disregard damning 
age-related remarks, and stating that the lower court impermissibly substituted its judgment for the 
jury’s); SPERINO, supra note 4, at 205–07 (noting that the Supreme Court has “at least implicitly” 
rejected the stray remarks doctrine in several cases, including Reeves). 
60.  See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 217–21; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 73–78; 
Martin, supra note 59, at 351–52; Semler, supra note 4, at 77. 
61.  See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 69–72; Martin, supra note 59, at 318–19, 356–89. 
62.  See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745–55 
(2011); Charles Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 191, 213–20 (2009); Hamilton, supra note 5, at 197–98, 200; Martin, supra note 59, at 
345–47; Semler, supra note 4, at 73; see also Lewis v. City of Union City, No. 15-11362 (11th Cir. 
2019) (en banc) (delineating all of the ways a comparator must be the same in order to satisfy the 
circuit’s standards and support a prima facie case). The Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail seems to directly repudiate this approach. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 n.11. 
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testimony that she was a good employee, on the grounds 
that it is self-interested and unreliable63; 
• dismissing evidence of pretext as an invitation for the 
court to sit as a “super-personnel department”64; 
• applying rigidly defined standards for where comparative 
qualifications can help prove pretext and thus 
discrimination65; and 
• others.66 
While the lower courts vary in their formulation and application of these technical 
doctrines, the practice of applying some version of such rules is widespread.67 
Often lost in all of these technical twists and turns is the fundamental 
factual question of whether the plaintiff was actually subjected to 
discrimination.68 Although, in theory, many “technical McDonnell 
Douglas” doctrines could be consistent with a fact-focused inquiry—if 
treated simply as one of many permissible inferences for the fact-finder to 
draw—their application in the case law almost never takes this form.69 
                                                     
63. See, e.g., Paul J. Sopher, Comment, Matters of Perspective: Restoring Plaintiffs’ Stories to 
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1031, 1053–57 (2012); but cf. infra Part II 
(detailing the Supreme Court’s rejection of similar rules in the context of defendants); Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 259–60 (reversing the lower court’s rejection of the defendant’s testimony as to its reason as 
only “unsubstantiated” and “subjective” assertions and requiring the lower courts to treat such 
testimony as sufficient at McDonnell Douglas Step Two). 
64. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 221–23; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 78–83. 
65. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 190–94; Martin, supra note 59, at 345–47. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ash v. Tyson renders this approach at least questionable. 564 U.S. 454, 457 (2006).  
66. The explosion of technical doctrines engrafted onto McDonnell Douglas is such that it is 
impossible to itemize all of its iterations. The listed doctrines are illustrative of the tendency of the 
courts to apply McDonnell Douglas in a hyper-technical way and to engraft it was technical doctrines.  
67. See sources cited supra notes 57–65. Note that even in those circuits that have nominally 
disclaimed technical approaches to McDonnell Douglas, like the Seventh Circuit, technical rules have 
remained remarkably “sticky.” See supra note 25. 
68.  See supra note 7. When I refer to the “factual question of discrimination” herein, I am referring 
to the question of discrimination as it is understood in the McDonnell Douglas context. Thus, the 
relevant question is one of individual disparate treatment—was the plaintiff treated differently 
“because of” their protected class status. While there are other possible conceptions of discrimination 
(such as disparate impact discrimination or reasonable accommodations), such conceptions are not 
included in the “factual question of discrimination” in the context of the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm. In addition, though there is a good argument that the relevant standard of causation in most 
Title VII McDonnell Douglas claims should be the lower “motivating factor” standard, most courts 
do not approach the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in that way, treating the relevant standard as 
arising from Title VII’s “because of” causation language. See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 
111–18. For linguistic and analytic ease, I follow that common convention here. Note, however, that 
the arguments made herein would equally apply, even if the ultimate standard of causation in some 
or all McDonnell Douglas cases were treated differently—the question would still be whether the 
plaintiff had shown the factual question of discrimination, to the relevant standard of causation. 
69. See sources cited supra notes 57–66. 
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Indeed, the primary context in which such doctrines are utilized—
summary judgment against plaintiffs—is inherently inconsistent with 
such a “permissible inferences” approach.70 Rather, courts have generally 
treated such doctrines as legal rules (rather than merely permissible 
factual inferences) and have ubiquitously relied on such doctrines to grant 
summary judgment against plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.71 
Under this technical legal approach to summary judgment, the fact that 
a reasonable jury might find that there was discrimination is treated as 
essentially irrelevant to the inquiry. As such, even cases with extremely 
compelling factual evidence have proven susceptible to dismissal under 
the technical McDonnell Douglas approach.72 And because plaintiffs are 
typically not permitted to simply side-step McDonnell Douglas (and ask, for 
example, the court to directly resolve the question of whether or not they were 
terminated “because of” their race or sex), discrimination plaintiffs often find 
their evidence shoehorned into the technical McDonnell Douglas approach 
and then dismissed before or even after trial.73 
                                                     
70. The use of such rules to grant summary judgment against plaintiffs is fundamentally 
inconsistent with conceptualizing them as permissive inferences for the fact-finder. If such inferences 
are only possible inferences to be considered in light of all the facts and circumstances, they should 
be left to the jury. Moreover, given that all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-
moving party at summary judgment, the use of these rules to find against the non-movant (drawing 
inferences against them) makes clear that these “rules” are treated by the courts as legal, rather than 
factual in nature. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 158–61 (describing the summary 
judgment standards, and how courts evade them in discrimination cases by relying on technical legal 
doctrines instead of focusing on the factual issue of discrimination).  
71. Specifically, these doctrines are used separately or in combination to hold that plaintiffs have 
not made out their prima facie case or have failed to prove pretext/the ultimate issue of discrimination. 
See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 298–301; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 158–61. Step Two 
of McDonnell Douglas is very rarely at issue on summary judgment, since virtually all employers can 
meet the burden of producing “some evidence” of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Id. 
72. See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 217 F.3d 212, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. 
Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232–33, 236, 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated on other 
grounds by Flame S.A. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2015); Indurante v. Local 705, 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 365–66 (7th Cir. 1998); Youry v. Exec. Transp. Co., 2013 WL 
4774447, *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013).  
73. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 72; see also SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 116 (noting 
that “many courts will only funnel circumstantial evidence cases through [the McDonnell Douglas] 
framework,” even though “the McDonnell Douglas decision states that the burden-shifting framework 
is not the only way for workers to establish discrimination through circumstantial evidence”). In 
theory, plaintiffs raising race, sex, national origin or religion claims should be able to proceed under 
the “mixed motives” framework instead, but it remains the case that the mixed motives framework is 
relied on far less often. See supra note 1. Courts also recognize “direct evidence” as another path to 
proving discrimination, but as Sperino and Thomas note, it is rare that courts find such evidence to 
exist. See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 114–15. Finally, a few circuits have experimented 
with alternatives to the McDonnell Douglas framework that more directly focus on the factual 
question of discrimination. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 330–32. 
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Although it is impossible to fully document the scores of cases in which 
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm has been applied, it is worth 
offering a few characteristic examples of the reasoning of such cases and 
the outcomes that result. For example, consider: 
• Taylor v. Virginia Union University74: Lynne Taylor was a 
patrol officer at Virginia Union University (VUU) who was 
fired for conduct (fraternizing with students) that male 
officers often engaged in without consequence. There was 
ample evidence that her supervisor, Chief Wells, harbored 
bias towards women: he had called Taylor a “stupid bitch,” 
75 stated directly that he would “never . . . send a female to 
the [Police] Academy,” and sexually harassed multiple 
female subordinates. 76 And yet, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that Taylor had not even made out a 
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas because she had 
not introduced proof of a comparator who engaged in 
virtually identical conduct.77 
• Youry v. Executive Transportation Co.78: Pierre Youry 
was a limousine driver allegedly terminated because of 
an obscenity carved in the dashboard of his car. Youry 
alleged, and the employer did not dispute, that the 
obscenity was already there when his employer provided 
him with the vehicle. Youry’s supervisor repeatedly used 
racial slurs to refer to Youry, calling him a “black 
bastard,” 79 a “black mother,” and telling him directly “I 
never liked you black Haitians.”80 Indeed, Youry testified 
that his supervisor called him a “black bastard” during the 
very conversation in which Youry was terminated.81 And 
yet the District Court granted summary judgment, 
defining pretext at Step Three of McDonnell Douglas as 
exclusively focused on showing that the reason given by 
the employer lacks factual support (something Youry 
                                                     
74. 193 F.3d 219, 232–33, 236, 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by 
Flame S.A. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2015). 
75. Id. at 227.  
76. Id.  
77. Id.; see also id. at 248 (Murnaghan, J. dissenting). The dismissal of Taylor’s termination claim on this 
rationale was one of several arguably problematic adverse rulings against Taylor and her co-plaintiff on appeal.  
78. No. 11-4103, 2013 WL 4774447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013).  
79. Id. at *5–6. 
80. Id. at *5–6. 
81. Id. at *5–6. 
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could not demonstrate because he acknowledged the 
obscenity was in fact carved into the dashboard).82 
• Maybin v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co.83: Carl Maybin 
was hired by Hilton Grand Vacations as a timeshare agent 
at age fifty-five and fired approximately two years later. 
Maybin testified that from the start, the Hawaii Director 
of Sales regularly made ageist comments about Maybin 
and the other the older sales agents, including statements 
that they “were too slow, can’t learn, have a different way 
of doing things, are hard to teach new ways of sales, are 
too old to change, and don’t have the energy necessary 
for sales.”84 The District Court awarded summary 
judgment, holding that Maybin’s claim must fail because 
the so-called “the same actor inference” (i.e., the negative 
inference arising from the fact that the same person hired 
and fired the defendant) prevented an inference of 
discrimination at McDonnell Douglas Step Three.85 
• Wallace v. Methodist Hospital86: Veronica Wallace was 
fired from her job as a nurse a month before she was 
about to take her third maternity leave. At trial, a witness 
testified that she had overheard plaintiff’s supervisor 
stating directly that Wallace was terminated because 
“she’s been pregnant three times in three years.”87 
Wallace’s supervisor had also made other remarks 
critical of Wallace’s repeated pregnancies.88 After a jury 
found in Wallace’s favor, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
an award of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the 
grounds that these statements were “stray remarks” under 
the circuit’s doctrine and thus “not evidence of 
intentional discrimination.”89 
Cases like Taylor’s, Youry’s, Maybin’s and Wallace’s are common in 
the federal reports.90 In such cases, courts pick and choose from among a 
                                                     
82. Id. at *5–6. 
83. 343 F. Supp. 3d 988 (D. Hawaii 2018). 
84. Id. at 990. 
85. Id. at 993–98.  
86. 217 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001). 
87. Id. at 222 (quotation omitted). 
88. Id. at 225–26. 
89. Id. at 222–24. 
90. See supra notes 4–10 & 52–73 and accompanying text. 
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variety of technical circuit doctrines, but virtually always arrive at the 
same result—dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.91 Sometimes, as in Taylor 
or Youry, the courts give the steps of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
(prima facie case or Step Three/pretext) primacy and interpret them as 
having rigid requirements, ignoring other probative evidence of 
discrimination.92 At other times, as in Maybin, they apply doctrines that 
have been engrafted by the lower courts onto the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm that give legally dispositive weight to only partially probative 
facts.93 In other cases, like Wallace, the courts rely on technical circuit 
rules like the stray remarks doctrine to dismiss even smoking gun 
evidence as “not evidence of intentional discrimination” and thus not 
relevant to the McDonnell Douglas inquiry.94 In these cases, the factual 
question of discrimination is rarely meaningfully asked, abandoned in 
favor of a series of technical inquiries.95 
As set out in the following Part, while this technical approach to the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm is new in its application to plaintiffs, it is 
not new in form. Many of the plaintiff-unfavorable technical approaches 
that the lower courts apply today bear a striking resemblance to the 
defendant-unfavorable doctrines that the lower courts adopted in the early 
years of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.96 There, too, the lower courts 
reasoned that the technical steps of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
should be construed rigidly and should take primacy over the factual 
question of discrimination.97 There too, the lower courts argued for 
decisive inferences to be drawn as a matter of law based on only partially 
probative facts.98 Just as some plaintiffs’ evidence is currently isolated and 
dismissed as insufficiently probative or reliable under legal rules attached 
to McDonnell Douglas, employers’ reasons and evidence were isolated 
and dismissed for strikingly similar reasons.99 And yet, the Supreme Court 
consistently rejected these defendant-burdening technical rules—
reasoning that the factual question of discrimination must ultimately 
                                                     
91. See supra notes 4–10 & 52–89 and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232–33, 236, 249; Youry, 2013 WL 4774447 at *5–6; see also 
supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
93. See, e.g., Maybin, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 994–98; see also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.  
94. Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222–24; see also supra notes 59 & 63–64 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text. 
96. See infra Part II. 
97. See infra Part II. 
98. See infra Part II. 
99. See infra Part II. 
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control.100 
Thus, the battle over the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm was 
already fought—and won by those urging it be rejected—more than 
twenty-five years ago.101 The edifice of technical anti-plaintiff rules that 
the lower courts have adopted in their revival of the technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm is simply inconsistent with this history. 
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST TECHNICAL 
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM 
A. The Supreme Court’s Initial Response to the First Technical 
McDonnell Douglas Paradigm: Unanimous Rejection (1973–1982) 
From the start, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was enmeshed in 
questions regarding the propriety of a technical, as opposed to a factual, 
approach to adjudicating discrimination claims. When the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm was first recognized, the Supreme Court had recently 
decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co.102—a decision that was understood to 
embrace a technical legal approach to adjudicating discrimination.103 The 
circuit courts had also begun to superintend the Title VII decisions of the 
district courts (then Title VII’s exclusive fact finders) through a number 
of technical legal doctrines.104 These technical doctrines—as well as 
aspects of Griggs’ legal approach to discrimination—would soon be 
attached by the lower courts to the new McDonnell Douglas paradigm. 
Indeed, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green105 itself was the result of a 
dispute over the propriety of such technical approaches. The District 
Court had issued a judgment against the plaintiff Percy Green—
dismissing certain claims before and others after trial.106 On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals had affirmed the judgment as to Green’s retaliation 
                                                     
100. See infra Part II. 
101. See infra Part II. 
102. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
103. Id. As described infra, many of the disputes over the first technical McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm related to whether elements of the disparate impact cause of action would be incorporated 
into adjudication of individual disparate treatment disputes. The Court consistently rejected lower 
court decisions that turned in this direction. See infra notes 118–133; see also Malamud, supra note 
4, at 2264–66 (making a similar observation). 
104. The rule at issue in McDonnell Douglas itself—expressing skepticism of employer’s 
“subjective” reasons—was such a rule, predating the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. See, e.g., Green 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972). 
105. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
106. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Green v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1969). 
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claim but had reversed as to his race discrimination claim.107 In instructing 
the District Court how to proceed on remand, the Eighth Circuit rejected 
a factual conception of discrimination, instead opining that “subjective” 
reasons for non-hiring are entitled to little or no weight (because they may 
mask prohibited prejudice).108 Rather, McDonnell Douglas was, the court 
suggested, required to show an “objective” reason—one related to Percy 
Green’s job competency—in order to prevail.109 
Though the Eighth Circuit quickly issued a modified opinion—largely 
substituting the now-familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework for its “objective” reasons requirement110—the Defendant 
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review.111 But at 
the Court, neither the plaintiff (represented by inter alia the LDF) nor any 
of the Justices embraced the Eighth Circuit’s original technical 
approach.112 Instead, at the Department of Justice’s urging, the Court 
unanimously adopted the now-familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm (prima facie case, legitimate non-discriminatory reason, 
pretext/ultimate issue of discrimination).113 And though the Court’s 
                                                     
107. See Green, 463 F.2d at 341–43. 
108. Id. at 353–54 (Johnsen, J., in supplemental dissent) (setting out the original wording of the 
Eighth Circuit’s opinion—soon amended). It is not clear what exactly the Eighth Circuit meant by 
this, since the employer’s reasons—that the plaintiff had participated in illegal protest activities 
directed at the company—wasn’t “subjective” in the traditional sense of, for example, an employer 
relying on “leadership qualities” to decide who gets a job. It appears rather that the Eighth Circuit’s 
dissatisfaction with the employer’s reason rested on its failure to satisfy the requirements of Griggs—
that it could not be shown (or at least had not been shown) to be related to the plaintiff’s ability to do 
his job. See id. at 353–54. 
109. Id. 
110. Although the modified opinion continued to include some language suggesting that 
“subjective” reasons were to be afforded less weight, it eliminated those parts of the opinion that most 
clearly required the employer to show the reason was job-related—as opposed to requiring the 
employee to show discrimination. See id. at 352–53. 
111. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1973). 
112. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 29–34, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 
(No. 72-490) (complaining that “the modified majority opinion of the Court of Appeals bears no relationship 
to the issues discussed in Petitioner’s argument,” and declining to defend the Griggs-style requirement of the 
Eighth Circuit); cf. id. at 26–29 (defending the Court of Appeals’ remarks about “subjective” standards but 
framing the issue in a way that left ambiguous whether the “subjective” nature of standards was simply one 
factor to be considered). As to the Justices, see, e.g., Blackmun Conference Notes, McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1973) (No. 72-490) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun 
Papers, Box 167 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]); Powell Conference Notes, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1973) (1973) (No. 72-490) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of 
Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, available at 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/ [https://perma.cc/3F3T-PKXY] [hereinafter Powell Papers]). 
113. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–05; see generally Memorandum for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 9–15, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (No. 72-
490) (suggesting a reading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion virtually identical to that ultimately 
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opinion left open the possibility that technical rules might play a role in 
the operation of the paradigm, much of its language suggested that it was 
the factual question of racial discrimination that should be dispositive.114 
Over the next decade, use of the “McDonnell Douglas paradigm” 
became ubiquitous, and disputes erupted in the lower courts regarding 
how it should be applied.115 It was not obvious to all courts (or to all 
commentators) that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was—as the 
Supreme Court would ultimately hold—simply a vehicle for “bring[ing] 
the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly” to the factual question 
of discrimination.116 Rather, many lower courts interpreted the doctrine as 
turning on legalistic determinations only impressionistically related to the 
factual question of disparate treatment.117 Thus, many circuits interpreted 
the paradigm in technical ways that aided discrimination plaintiffs, 
permitting—or even requiring—liability in contexts where a defendant 
might not have factually engaged in disparate treatment.118 
Four cases involving disputes over such technical rules came up to the 
Supreme Court in the decade following McDonnell Douglas.119 And in 
each, the Court rejected the lower courts’ defendant-burdening technical 
approach.120 Thus, although some circuits continued to hold—as the 
                                                     
adopted by the Court in McDonnell Douglas). 
114.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05 (describing the variety of forms of 
circumstantial evidence of race discrimination that might be relevant at Step Three, including but not 
limited to evidence that the employer’s reason was not the real reason); id. at 805 n.18 (suggesting 
that the ultimate question was whether “the decision was in reality racially premised”); cf. id. at 805–
06 (specifically repudiating the lower court’s reliance on Griggs standards). 
115. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a 
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, n.11, 86, 100, 110, 145 (1981); Miguel Angel 
Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. 
L. REV. 1129, 1130–31 (1980); see also infra notes 119–133 and accompanying text. 
116. See sources cited supra note 115; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253 (1981) (holding that the burden of proving discrimination rests with the plaintiff and that the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm is simply a way of bringing “the litigants and the court expeditiously 
and fairly to this ultimate question”); US Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715–
16 (1983) (same, and emphasizing that the question of whether discrimination took place is a factual 
one that ought not be treated differently than other issues of fact—even in the context of cases to 
which the McDonnell Douglas paradigm applies). 
117. See infra notes 119–133 and accompanying text. 
118. See infra notes 119–133 and accompanying text. 
119. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248; Bd. of Trustees of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 
(1978); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
427 U.S. 273 (1976); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) 
(rejecting the employer’s argument that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was a test that must 
be fulfilled in every case where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff seeks relief).  
120. See infra notes 121–133 and accompanying text. McDonald involved a rule that ordinarily 
burdened defendants—that the focus ought to be on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s 
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Eighth Circuit had in McDonnell Douglas—that the focus ought to be on 
the substantive adequacy of the employer’s justification, the Court 
repeatedly rejected that approach.121 In doing so, the Court reiterated that, 
“[t]he central focus of the inquiry in a [McDonnell Douglas case] is 
always whether the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”122 
For this reason, “the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of 
proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate 
consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race.”123 Applying these 
principles, the Court repeatedly rejected decisions of the lower courts 
which focused on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s LNDR, 
rather than simply its non-discriminatory nature.124 
So, too, the Court rejected rigid lower court rules deeming certain 
employer evidence insufficiently dispositive or too subjective (and thus 
                                                     
LNDR, rather than the factual question of disparate treatment—but in a circumstance where it had 
been applied to a plaintiff.  
121. This focus on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s reason took a variety of forms—
including, for example, a focus on whether the employee had committed a serious offense as the 
ultimate issue, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975), requirements 
that employers adopt hiring policies having a lesser racial impact, see, for example, Waters v. Furnco 
Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1085, 108889 (7th Cir. 1977), and refusal to accept “subjective” employer 
reasons or “subjective” employer testimony, see, for example, Burdine v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 
608 F.2d 563, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1979). It was also a remarkably persistent trend, continuing to show 
up in lower court opinions even after multiple Supreme Court decisions made clear the substantive 
adequacy of the employer’s decision was not the focus in a McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment 
case. See infra notes 122–124; see also Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(appearing to revive technical constraints on an employer’s Step Two response similar to those that 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected). It appears likely that this tendency in the lower courts 
arose at least in part out of a conflation of disparate treatment and disparate impact in some circuits’ 
case law. Id.; see, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 9–12, 
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (No. 79-1764) (observing that the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach in Burdine appeared to arise out of a conflation of the disparate impact and 
disparate treatment methodologies). For cases where the Court repudiated lower court decisions that 
had focused at least in part on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s reason—sometimes 
conflating that concern with the substantive adequacy of the employer’s evidence, see Furnco Constr. 
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Vaughn, 450 U.S. 972 (1981) (granting, vacating, and remanding a case in which the trial court had 
found that there was not enough evidence to determine whether the production problems the plaintiff 
had were “serious enough” to carry the employer’s burden at McDonnell Douglas Step Two). 
122. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). 
123. Id. Furnco is the case that most directly addressed this issue, though as described supra note 
121, several other Supreme Court cases during this time frame also responded in part to the lower 
courts’ treatment of the substantive adequacy of the employers’ reasons as dispositive in the 
McDonnell Douglas context—always repudiating this approach. 
124. See supra note 121. 
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off-limits).125 Reasoning that “the employer must be allowed some 
latitude to introduce evidence which bears on his motive,” the Court 
repeatedly reversed lower court decisions applying rules that would limit 
the range of employer evidence that could be considered.126 Noting that 
the Plaintiff’s prima facie case was not the equivalent of an ultimate 
factual showing of discrimination, the Court opined that even weak 
evidence of the employer’s motive should be considered in assessing that 
ultimate factual issue.127 
And finally, in the cases of Board of Trustees of Keene State College 
v. Sweeney128 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,129 
the Court rejected the last vestiges of these constraints on the employer’s 
LNDR and proof.130 Holding that the lower courts were wrong to place a 
burden on the Defendant beyond simply “articulating” its legitimate non-
discriminatory reason, the Court rejected the lower courts’ rules requiring 
more.131 Such rules had arisen out of the lower courts’ concerns about the 
substantive inadequacy of employers’ LNDRs and employers’ unreliable 
proof (such as subjective employer testimony).132 But the Supreme Court 
                                                     
125. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579–80 (holding that the circuit court was wrong to deem certain 
employer evidence off-limits for consideration, even though it might not be dispositive); St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513–14, 514 n.5 (1993) (emphasizing that it is important for a jury 
to be able to consider all available employer evidence in deciding whether, as a matter of fact, 
discrimination took place); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) 
(reversing a lower court decision that had held that the employer did not meet their Step Two burden, 
in which the court had conflated the substantive and proof adequacy of the employer’s reasons, 
including questioning the adequacy of the employer’s “subjective” testimony as to the reasons); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Vaughn, 450 U.S. 972 (1981) (granting, vacating, and remanding post-
Burdine in relation to a similar lower court opinion). 
126. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580; see also sources cited supra note 125. 
127. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580; see also sources cited supra note 125. 
128. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).  
129. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
130. This last issue could be characterized as less about technical rules that might distract from the 
ultimate factual question of discrimination, and more about who bears the burden of proof on that 
ultimate factual question. However, the issue of the burden of proof in fact was often bound up in the 
lower courts with issues about the substantive adequacy of the employer’s given reason, and the 
weight permissible to be given to an employer’s potentially self-serving subjective testimony. See 
infra note 132. Thus, reversal of the circuit court rules on this issue also implicated the substantive 
adequacy and evidentiary adequacy issues discussed above, and indeed in the case of Burdine arose 
out of a lower court opinion explicitly focused on those issues. See Burdine v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. 
Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1979). 
131. See supra notes 128–129. 
132. See, e.g., Burdine, 608 F.2d at 567–68 (concluding that an employer’s “bald assertion[s]” and 
reliance on “subjective” evaluations was insufficient to meet their burden at Step Two); Vaughn v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 658–60 (8th Cir. 1980) (where there was conflicting 
evidence as to the veracity of the employer’s Step Two reasons, and some of them rested on subjective 
criteria, concluding that the employer’s Step Two burden had not been met).  
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rejected the idea that prophylactic legal rules to address such concerns 
could be adopted, holding instead that “[t]he ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”133 
None of these issues generated significant disputes among the 
Justices.134 While ancillary issues produced dissension in a few cases, the 
Justices were, in the initial period following McDonnell Douglas, 
unanimous in rejecting the lower courts’ embrace of technical McDonnell 
Douglas rules.135 Indeed, internal records demonstrate that the Justices 
generally perceived the lower courts as simply wrong insofar as they 
adopted or applied technical rules in ways that distracted from the ultimate 
factual question of discrimination.136 
Even plaintiffs’ counsel (often in this era the LDF) generally did not 
offer a full-throated endorsement of the lower courts’ technical 
approaches.137 Rather, plaintiffs typically argued (at times perhaps less 
                                                     
133. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
134. As set out below, all of the cases except Sweeney were ultimately unanimous on the relevant 
issues, and generally did not produce even significant behind the scenes dissent. See infra notes 135–
136. And in Sweeney, the Justices did not differ materially in relation to the proper standard—but 
only in relation to whether they thought the lower court had complied with it. Compare Bd. of Trs. of 
Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978) (majority opinion articulating the view that 
the employer need only produce evidence of its legitimate non-discriminatory reason, and that the 
plaintiff at all times bears the burden of proof), with id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating a 
virtually indistinguishable standard); see also infra notes 135–136. 
135. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); 
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); supra 
note 134 (noting that although Sweeney was not unanimous, the Justices agreed on the substantive 
standard—they just disagreed over whether the lower court had complied with it). Regarding the 
Justices’ ancillary disputes on unrelated issues, see McDonald, 427 U.S. at 296 (Justices White and 
Rehnquist dissenting on the unrelated issue of whether § 1981 applies to private employment) and 
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 581–85 (Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting on whether the plaintiff 
should be permitted to pursue a disparate impact cause of action on remand). 
136. See, e.g., Powell Conference Notes, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 
(1976) (No. 75-260), in Powell Papers, supra note 112 (showing that many of the Justices perceived 
the Eighth Circuit’s articulated standards as wrong, and none substantively defended them at 
Conference); Powell Conference Notes, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (No. 77-
369), in Powell Papers, supra note 112 (showing that none of the Justices defended the Seventh 
Circuit’s technical approach in Furnco, and many disagreed with it at Conference); Brennan 
Conference Notes, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (No. 77-369) (on file with the 
Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box I:432, folder 1) [hereinafter Brennan 
Papers]) (same); Blackmun Conference Notes, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) 
(No. 77-369), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 273 (same); Powell Conference Notes, Tex. 
Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, No. 79-1764 (Dec. 12, 1980) in Powell Papers, supra note 112 
(showing that none of the Justices defended the Fifth Circuit’s technical approach in Burdine, and 
many of the Justices critiqued it at Conference); Blackmun Conf. Notes, Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (No. 79-1764) in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 329 (same).  
137. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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than candidly) that the lower courts’ opinions were misconstrued by the 
defendants seeking review.138 Thus, throughout the first decade of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, there was little support at the Supreme 
Court level for a technical conception of McDonnell Douglas.139 
B. Divides Over the First McDonnell Douglas Paradigm Emerge on 
the Supreme Court (1983-1992) 
This began to shift in the early 1980s. In the 1980s (and into the 1990s), 
the LDF became increasingly staunch defenders of the remaining lower 
court doctrines that construed McDonnell Douglas technically.140 And the 
liberal Justices on the Court shifted too—perhaps following the LDF’s 
lead.141 In short order, this led to the eruption of disputes on the Court 
regarding whether such technical approaches were permissible.142 
                                                     
138. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 29, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 
(No. 72-490) (NAACP authored brief for the plaintiff, complaining that the “modified opinion of the 
Court of Appeals bears no relationship to the issues discussed in Petitioner’s argument,” and not 
defending the Griggs-style requirement of the Court of Appeals). Cf. id. at 26–29 (defending the Court 
of Appeals’ remarks about “subjective” standards, but framing the issue in a way that left ambiguous 
whether “subjective” nature of standards was simply one factor to be considered); Brief for 
Respondents, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (No. 77-369) (NAACP authored 
brief for the plaintiff, predominantly arguing from the strong facts, instead of in support of the Court 
of Appeals’ technical rules); Brief for the Respondent, Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248 (1981) (No. 79-1764) (brief for the plaintiff—authored by a private attorney—arguing in 
part in support of the Court of Appeals’ approach); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (No. 
75-260) (in a case where the technical rule disadvantaged a plaintiff, but a “reverse discrimination” 
plaintiff, arguing that the technical rule was wrong, but that on these facts the evidence showed there 
was no discrimination).  
139. See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
140. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text. 
141. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text. I use the term “liberal Justices” to 
connote the set of Justices who regularly during this time frame voted in favor of what could be 
perceived as liberal interests. During the relevant time frame (1983 through mid-1993), this included 
a block of three-to-four Justices, including at least Justice Harry Blackmun, Justice William Brennan 
(who left the Court in 1990), and Justice Thurgood Marshall (who left the Court in 1991). Sometimes 
joining these three were Justice Byron White (who drifted right during this time frame), Justice John 
Paul Stevens (who drifted left) and Justice David Souter (who joined the Court in the early 1990s). 
See generally Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 566 
n.142 (2014) (discussing the drift of Justices Stevens and White specifically on race matters); 
Ideological Leanings of United States Supreme Court Justices, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_leanings_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_justices 
[https://perma.cc/7J9R-73TJ] (showing the Martin-Quinn scores, a measure of ideological leaning, of the 
above Supreme Court Justices over time); Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQ3S-NTZE] 
(showing the composition of the Court during the relevant time frame). 
142. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text. 
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Ultimately, these disputes were resolved in favor of a non-technical, 
factually focused McDonnell Douglas approach, but only after a decade 
of internal dissension and debate.143 
These debates would eventually come to center on the lower courts’ 
defendant-burdening technical rules at Step Three of McDonnell 
Douglas—rules that made a finding of pretext dispositive even in the 
absence of a factual finding of discrimination.144 But they originally 
emerged in a case involving the technical application of McDonnell 
Douglas to disadvantage a plaintiff—then a more rare occurrence.145 
Thus, it was a case involving the lower courts’ rigid application of the 
prima facie case—United States Postal Service v. Aikens146—that first led 
to significant disputes on the Court regarding the propriety of technical 
McDonnell Douglas approaches. 
In theory, Aikens ought not to have been a controversial case. Aikens 
had introduced extremely strong evidence of discrimination—evidence 
that even the conservative Justices147 agreed was enough to prove 
discrimination.148 Moreover, the parties essentially agreed that the case 
should narrowly focus on how the technical prima facie case standard 
should be formulated and not on whether a technical approach was 
permissible in the first place.149 But an amicus brief by the American 
                                                     
143. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text. 
144. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text. 
145. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
146. 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
147. I use the term “conservative Justices” to connote the set of Justices who regularly during this time 
frame voted in favor of what could be perceived as conservative interests. During the relevant time frame 
(1983-mid-1993), this included a block of three-to-four Justices, including Justice William Rehnquist, 
Justice Warren Burger (who left the Court in 1986), Justice Antonin Scalia (who joined the Court in 1986), 
Justice Clarence Thomas (who joined the Court in 1991), and sometimes also Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
(who joined the Court in 1981) and Justice Anthony Kennedy (who joined the Court in 1988). See generally 
Ideological Leanings of United States Supreme Court Justices, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_leanings_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_justices 
[https://perma.cc/7J9R-73TJ] (showing the Martin-Quinn scores, a measure of ideological leaning, of the 
above Supreme Court Justices over time); Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQ3S-NTZE] 
(showing the composition of the Court during the relevant time frame). 
148. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.2 (1983) (opinion joined by all of the 
Court’s conservatives, agreeing that Aikens had introduced enough evidence to prove discrimination). Aikens 
had introduced evidence inter alia that the primary decision-maker had repeatedly made racist remarks, 
including about Aikens, that blacks were consistently passed over for promotion, and that those promoted over 
Aikens had vastly inferior qualifications. See generally Brief for the Respondent, U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711 (1983) (No. 81-1044) (NAACP authored brief for the plaintiff, detailing the strong evidence of 
discrimination) [hereinafter Aikens Respondent’s Brief]. 
149. Cf. Aikens Respondent’s Brief, at 55–83 (focusing their argument entirely on the prima facie 
case issue, rather than arguing that the focus on the specific requirements of the prima facie case was 
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Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-
CIO)—arguing that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm had devolved into 
a series of technical rules and ought to be abandoned in favor of a factual 
approach—made Aikens the unlikely site for initial disputes to erupt over 
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm.150 
Aikens might have been expected to support the ALF-CIO’s call for 
the abandonment of the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, given 
that he had been burdened by such a technical McDonnell Douglas 
approach in the lower courts.151 But the LDF, representing Aikens, did not 
welcome the AFL-CIO’s call for the paradigm to be abandoned.152 To the 
contrary, the LDF framed the AFL-CIO’s argument as a wholesale attack 
on anti-discrimination plaintiffs.153 Reasoning that Aikens himself had a 
“very unusual” case, insofar as there was explicit evidence that his 
supervisor was “racist,” the LDF opined that for the vast majority of 
plaintiffs who have only circumstantial evidence, McDonnell Douglas 
remained essential.154 Thus, the LDF called on the Justices to 
“unequivocally reject[] . . . [a]ny suggestion that McDonnell Douglas 
should be overruled or applied only to a limited category of cases.”155 
Like the LDF, the Court’s liberal Justices also strongly opposed the 
                                                     
erroneous given the overwhelming evidence of discrimination in the case); Brief for the Petitioner, 
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S.711 (1983) (No. 81-1044) (also focusing exclusively on whether 
the prima facie case was made out). 
150. See Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae at 7–12, 23–29, U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 
(1983) (No. 81-1044) [hereinafter Aikens AFL-CIO Amicus Brief]. 
151. See Aikens v. Bolger, No. 77-0303, 1984 WL 48949, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1984). Note that 
although the parties framed the case as focused on the District Court’s technical requirements for the 
prima facie case, it is also possible to read the District Court opinion as also holding against the 
plaintiff on the bottom-line factual question of discrimination. Id. Even in that domain, however, the 
Court appeared to apply a technical conception requiring specific types of evidence to prove 
discrimination. Regardless, neither party focused on this issue significantly on appeal. See generally 
sources cited supra note 149. 
152. See infra notes 153–155 and accompanying text. 
153. See, e.g., Aikens Respondent’s Brief, supra note 148, at 55–67. This response was likely 
colored by the major disputes that had emerged by this juncture between the AFL-CIO and racial 
justice advocates in the area of seniority and the application of affirmative action. See generally 
DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY AFTER THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7–9 (2012) (describing the role of the AFL-CIO in promoting civil rights, 
and their turn in the 1970s against affirmative action). The tenor of the AFL-CIO’s brief—which 
utterly ignored the plaintiff’s strong evidence of discrimination and said he had not even made out a 
prima facie case—doubtless also contributed to the LDF’s perception that the AFL-CIO’s proposal 
was not a plaintiff-friendly one. See Aikens AFL-CIO Amicus Brief, supra note 150, at 13–14. 
154. Oral Argument at 47:37, U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (No. 81-
1044), available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1044 [https://perma.cc/8TGX-EB79].  
155. See Aikens Respondent’s Brief, supra note 148, at 67. 
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AFL-CIO’s suggestion of limiting or abandoning McDonnell Douglas.156 
As such, when Justice Rehnquist drafted an initial opinion that favored 
Aikens but found the McDonnell Douglas paradigm inapplicable to his 
case,157 all of the liberal Justices refused to join.158 Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion held that Aikens had introduced sufficient evidence to prove the 
ultimate factual question of discrimination, not just a prima facie case—a 
holding that arguably put Aikens in a better position than Justice 
Marshall’s draft dissent. But because the opinion also held that the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm was inapplicable to a host of 
circumstances, the liberal Justices perceived it as an attack on the 
enforcement of anti-discrimination law.159 
Faced with an inability to attract a majority, Justice Rehnquist 
ultimately revised his opinion to adopt a compromise position acceptable 
to all of the Justices, save Justice Marshall.160 No longer repudiating the 
                                                     
156. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
157. See Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion One (Dec. 9, 1982) at 8–9, in Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Supreme Court Case Files, United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/622/ [https://perma.cc/X6NC-A6CB] [hereinafter 
Powell Papers – Aikens]); Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion Two (Jan. 14, 1983) at 8–9, in Powell 
Papers – Aikens, supra note 157. 
158. See Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William 
H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 9, 1982), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra 
note 157; Draft Dissent by Justice Marshall,  (Jan. 11, 1983) at 1, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra 
note 157, [hereinafter Marshall Aikens Draft Dissent]; Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 
12, 1983), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157; Memorandum from Henry A. Blackmun, Assoc. 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 13, 
1983), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157. As set out infra note 160, many of the Court’s 
moderates also objected to the opinion, albeit for somewhat different reasons. 
159. Compare Marshall Aikens Draft Dissent, supra note 158, at 9–13 (focusing on whether Aikens 
had made out a prima facie case only, though also noting in a footnote that he would also find the 
District Court holding that the defendant’s explanation was not pretextual “clearly erroneous”), with 
Rehnquist Aikens 1st Draft, supra note 158, at 8–10 (holding that Aikens’s evidence was sufficient 
to support an ultimate holding of discrimination, and remanding to the District Court on that issue). 
It appears clear that the liberals, like the LDF, viewed the preservation of the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm as highly important for plaintiffs—not an unreasonable view given the then-open question 
of the impact of a finding of pretext. It may also be that like the LDF, the liberal Justices viewed 
Aikens’s case—with its extremely strong evidence of discrimination—as aberrational and viewed the 
issue of most importance as the overarching legal framework for circumstantial evidence plaintiffs. 
160. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); see also Memorandum 
from William H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 3, 1983) at 1–2, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157; Justice 
Rehnquist, Alternate Draft Opinion (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens) (Mar. 13, 1983) 
at 3–5, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157; Join Sheet (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens) (n.d.), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157. For the concerns that led the Court’s 
moderates to decline to join—depriving Justice Rehnquist of his majority—see Justice Powell, Draft 
Concurrence (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens) (Feb. 17, 1983) at 3–4, in Powell Papers 
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applicability of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a whole, Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court instead focused on its erroneous 
application in the specific procedural posture of Aikens’s case.161 Noting 
that Aikens’s case had been “fully tried on the merits,” the Court opined 
that a focus on the prima facie case at this stage “unnecessarily evaded the 
ultimate question of discrimination vel non.”162 Rather, after the 
employer’s LNDR has been articulated, a court should direct its attention 
to the factual question of “whether ‘the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff.’”163 Moreover, the Court emphasized, 
courts “should [not] treat discrimination differently from other ultimate 
questions of fact.”164 
But while Aikens was virtually unanimous and seemed to embrace a 
factually, not technically, focused understanding of McDonnell Douglas, 
the apparent agreement among the Justices masked substantial remaining 
divisions.165 Although he published no opinion, Justice Marshall refused 
to join Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Aikens, concurring 
only in the judgment.166 And Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice 
Brennan, published a concurring opinion that—while nominally agreeing 
that the ultimate issue in a McDonnell Douglas case was the factual 
question of discrimination—also stated that a technical showing of 
pretext, if present, must control.167 Thus, although Aikens appeared to be 
yet another unanimous rejection of the technical McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm, it in fact represented the beginning of substantial divisions on 
                                                     
– Aikens, supra note 157; Justice O’Connor, Draft Concurrence (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors 
v. Aikens) (Feb. 22, 1983) at 1–2, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157. 
161. See infra notes 162–164 and accompanying text. 
162. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713–14. 
163. Id. at 715. This aspect of Supreme Court case law alone should mean that the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case should virtually never form the basis for dismissals of plaintiffs’ claims, 
since as a practical matter, the employer virtually always comes forward with the LNDR by the time 
the case reaches dispositive motions (and often long before). See, e.g., Brady v. Office of Sergeant at 
Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing this implication of Aikens). Nevertheless, 
many of the lower courts still contravene Aikens by granting summary judgment, and sometimes even 
judgment as a matter of law, based on the plaintiffs’ failure to make out the prima facie case—despite 
the fact that the employer has articulated their LNDR. Id. at 493 (noting that courts “often wrestle 
with the question whether the employee made out a prima facie case” at summary judgment, despite 
the fact that under Aikens, “judicial inquiry into the prima facie case is usually misplaced”). 
164. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716. 
165. See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text; Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (emphasizing that 
discrimination should not be treated differently from other ultimate questions of fact, even in the 
McDonnell Douglas context). 
166. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
167. See id. at 717–18 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring). 
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the Court. 
In the decade following Aikens, these divisions continued to deepen 
behind the scenes, though they rarely surfaced. Most notably, during the 
1988 Term, a series of cases demonstrated that the Justices remained 
divided and that their ideological alignment remained largely the same—
despite an increasing trend in the lower courts towards plaintiffs being 
burdened with technical McDonnell Douglas rules.168 In these cases, the 
Court’s liberal Justices continued to adhere to a technical vision of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm—even in some circumstances where doing 
so seemed to burden plaintiffs.169 In contrast, the Court’s conservative 
Justices continued to align themselves largely with a flexible version of 
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, under which the Court’s focus must 
remain at all times on the ultimate factual question of discrimination.170 
The most central case in which the Justices took up these issues was 
also ultimately the least momentous. Harbison-Walker v. Brieck171 
seemed on its face a straightforward case regarding what was required to 
defeat summary judgment in a McDonnell Douglas case.172 But 
previewing a set of issues that would be resolved later in St. Mary’s Honor 
and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,173 the Justices in Harbison-Walker 
divided sharply over what should be the implications of a finding of 
pretext.174 Mirroring the arguments made by Justices Blackmun and 
Brennan in Aikens, some of the liberal Justices continued to insist that a 
finding of pretext was dispositive in a McDonnell Douglas case and 
required a finding in favor of the plaintiff.175 In contrast, conservative 
                                                     
168. See infra notes 171–194 and accompanying text. 
169. See infra notes 171–194 and accompanying text. 
170. See infra notes 171–194 and accompanying text. 
171. 488 U.S. 226 (1988).  
172. Id.; see also Preliminary Memorandum from S.T., Law Clerk, to the Cert. Pool on Oct. 9, 
1987 Conference, at 7–9 (circulated Sept. 23, 1987), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 514 
(framing the issue as the “narrow” one of what type of pretext evidence a plaintiff must introduce in 
order to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination case). 
173. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
174. See infra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. Further complicating matters, the Justices at 
times conflated the questions of whether plaintiff proof of pretext (in the sense of falsity) was 
sufficient for a finding of discrimination with the distinctive question of whether it required a finding 
of discrimination. In theory, the latter question was not raised by Harbison-Walker, since the only 
question posed by an employer’s summary judgment motion is whether the jury could find for the 
plaintiff based on pretext, not whether they are required to do so. Nevertheless, several of the liberal 
Justices addressed the case in terms of whether the fact-finder would be required to find for the 
plaintiff if they found pretext. See sources cited infra note 175. 
175. See, e.g., Justice Brennan, Case Notes (Harbison-Walker v. Brieck) (n.d.), in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 136, Box I:801; Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (Harbison-Walker Refractories v. 
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Justices like Scalia complained that this “would rewrite the statute,” 
which requires a plaintiff to “prove discrimination.”176 Although Justice 
Kennedy would (at Justice Brennan’s urging) briefly attempt to devise “a 
rationale that would obtain a probable concurrence of the majority of the 
Court,” the Justices would quickly—and virtually unanimously—decide 
to dismiss the case as improvidently granted.177 
Though Harbison-Walker was dismissed as improvidently granted, two 
other cases during the 1988 Term would also force the Justices to grapple 
with the role of McDonnell Douglas and whether it should be understood as 
a technically or factually focused paradigm. The first of these—Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union178—was a holdover from the 1987 Term and was 
principally divisive among the Justices for reasons unrelated to the 
appropriate application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.179 Indeed, the 
Justices—though sharply divided on other issues—were unanimous that the 
district court had erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was required to 
prove she was “better qualified” than the person who received the promotion 
she sought (rather than simply proving “discrimination”).180 Noting that there 
were “various ways in which petitioner might seek to prove intentional 
discrimination,” the majority reasoned (and the concurrence agreed) that it 
was error to “force[] [the plaintiff] to pursue any particular means of 
demonstrating . . . pretext[].”181 Thus, in Patterson, the Justices were once 
again in agreement that the lower court’s technical rule—here requiring a 
showing of superior qualifications in promotions cases—was erroneous.182 
                                                     
Brieck) (Nov. 2, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 514. 
176. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck) 
(Nov. 2, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 514. 
177. See Harbison-Walker v. Brieck, 488 U.S. 226 (1988); Memorandum from Justice Kennedy to 
the Chief Justice and the Conference (Nov. 3, 1988), in Brennan Papers, supra note 136, Box I:801 
(memorandum with handwritten marking making clear that Brennan encouraged Kennedy in his 
attempt to formulate a draft that would satisfy a majority of the Justices). 
178. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
179. Patterson became a highly controversial case when the conservative Justices on the Court 
called for briefing and reargument to reconsider whether § 1981 applied to private discrimination in 
contracts. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (ordering reargument on the 
issue of whether § 1981 applies to discrimination in private contracts). While the Court ultimately 
reaffirmed that it does apply to private discrimination, the Justices were also divided over whether 
harassment claims could be actionable under § 1981. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175–85 (majority, 
holding that harassment was not actionable under § 1981); id. at 212–15 (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (reaching the opposite conclusion). 
180. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187–88; see also id. at 215–18, 218 n.18 (concur and dissent, reaching 
very similar conclusion). 
181. Id. at 188. 
182. See supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text.  
 
05 - Eyer (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  5:52 PM 
998 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:967 
 
But the final case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,183 would once again 
see the Justices dividing over the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, 
largely along ideological lines. Presenting the question of whether a 
“mixed motives” paradigm should also be available—and if so, what form 
it should take—Price Waterhouse arguably did not require the Justices to 
address disputes over the proper form of the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm.184 A “mixed motives” burden-shifting framework had long 
existed in constitutional law, allowing the plaintiff to shift the burden to 
the defendant to disprove the causal impact of discrimination upon a 
showing of multiple motives (some discriminatory, some not).185 And 
yet—as early applications of McDonnell Douglas itself had 
demonstrated—this was not the only possible way of legally evaluating 
claims in which there were multiple motives (including both 
discrimination and legitimate motives) at play.186 Thus, it was certainly 
possible for the Court to embrace a “mixed motives” paradigm alongside 
McDonnell Douglas, even if the factual situations to which they applied 
might overlap.187 But in Price Waterhouse, the defendant’s briefs 
reasoned to the contrary, arguing that if McDonnell Douglas was 
sufficient to accommodate cases in which there were multiple motives, no 
                                                     
183. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
184. While some of the possible resolutions of Price Waterhouse would have turned on the proper 
understanding of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the actual resolution that the court settled on—
recognizing a distinctive “mixed motives” burden-shifting paradigm—did not. Cf. Justice Blackmun, 
Handwritten Notes (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins) (Oct. 29, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 
112, Box 519 (pre-conference notes by Justice Blackmun, suggesting that mixed motives should be 
folded into the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, with the ultimate question on the merits being whether 
or not protected class status was a “subst[antial]” or “motivat[in]g” factor). 
185. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977). 
186. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) is the most striking example of 
this. In McDonald, the Supreme Court applied McDonnell Douglas to a disparate treatment case, 
despite the fact that the employer’s “legitimate” motive—disciplining employees for theft—was 
undisputed to be a factor in the termination. See id. at 283–84. The Court reasoned that under 
McDonnell Douglas, race need not be the sole cause, only a “but for” cause. Id. at 282 n.10. 
187. Indeed, this is effectively the regime that exists in most circuits today as to non-retaliation 
claims under Title VII, since most circuits have held that the bottom-line question in a McDonnell 
Douglas case is whether protected class status was a “but for” cause, not whether it was a sole cause. 
See, e.g., Jones v. Okla. Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277–79 (10th Cir. 2010) (in a McDonnell Douglas 
case, holding that “but for” causation, not “sole” causation is the standard); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 
F.3d 586, 597–99 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that “but for” rather than “sole” cause, was the standard in 
cases that do not qualify for mixed motives burden shifting). This means that, just like in McDonald, 
a plaintiff can prevail in a McDonnell Douglas case even where the employer’s LNDR played a role 
in the outcome, so long as protected class status tipped the balance. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282 
n.10. Thus, claims that involve both legitimate and illegitimate motives can be brought via either the 
McDonnell Douglas or the “mixed motives” paradigm. See, e.g., Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 
844–47 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that cases involving both legitimate and illegitimate motives can 
be brought either via the McDonnell Douglas or the “mixed motives” paradigm). 
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additional paradigm should be available.188 
This framing resulted in the curious spectacle of the Court’s liberal 
Justices embracing a very technical, narrow, and plaintiff-unfavorable 
view of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm’s operation in their plurality 
opinion embracing the mixed-motives paradigm.189 Rather than a vehicle 
for ascertaining the factual question of whether discrimination took 
place—something that a plaintiff could prove even if the employer’s 
reason was not proven false—the plurality instead portrayed McDonnell 
Douglas as a paradigm in which the plaintiff was required to prove the 
employer’s reason was untrue.190 They thus portrayed McDonnell Douglas as 
a rigid either/or affair in which the plaintiff either succeeded at Step Three in 
proving the employer’s reason was entirely false, or they lost.191 
In contrast, the conservative Justices in dissent (rejecting a separate 
mixed motives paradigm) embraced a far more flexible—and arguably far 
more plaintiff-friendly—vision of McDonnell Douglas.192 Treating 
McDonnell Douglas as an “orderly and adequate way to place both 
inferential and direct proof before the factfinder for a determination 
whether intentional discrimination [took place],” the conservative 
dissenters argued that plaintiffs were not restricted at Step Three to 
showing the employer’s reason to be false.193 Rather, a plaintiff might also 
directly “persuade the court that the employment decision was motivated 
by discrimination”—something that did not require the plaintiff to show 
that the employer’s reason was false or even to rule out that the employer’s 
LNDR was a partial cause of the employment decision.194 
As demonstrated by the 1988 Term, the divides that emerged in Aikens 
had not disappeared by the late 1980s—far from it. Rather, though the 
liberal and conservative Justices occasionally reunited to reject technical 
                                                     
188. In other words, the defendant argued that if a McDonnell Douglas plaintiff could prevail, even 
where both discrimination and the employer’s LNDR played a partial role, then no additional 
paradigm should be available. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989) (No. 87-1167), 1988 WL 1025858, at *29–33. 
189. See infra notes 190–191 and accompanying text. 
190. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 n.6, 246–47, 247 n.12 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
191. Id. 
192. See id. at 284, 287–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 288. 
194. Id. at 289; see also id. at 284 (dissent, noting that protected class status only had to be a cause, 
not a sole cause, under Title VII, meaning one that “either by itself or in combination with other 
factors . . . made a difference to the decision”); supra note 186 and accompanying text (observing that 
prior to Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court had applied McDonnell Douglas to situations in which 
the employer’s legitimate motivation had played a role, and had specified in those contexts that 
protected class status need only be a “but for” cause). 
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McDonnell Douglas rules, they increasingly viewed the paradigm 
differently. For the liberal Justices, the paradigm was one that they cast as 
a series of technical rules, potentially divorced from the ultimate factual 
question of discrimination. In contrast, the conservative Justices aligned 
themselves largely with a flexible, factually focused version of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm in which the factual question of 
discrimination remained the core concern at all times. 
C. The Demise of the First Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm 
in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 
It was against this backdrop that St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 
came up to the Court in 1993.195 At last, St. Mary’s Honor squarely 
presented the issue raised by Justices Blackmun and Brennan in Aikens: 
whether a finding of pretext required a holding for the plaintiff in a 
McDonnell Douglas case.196 The court of appeals in St. Mary’s Honor had 
so held, reversing despite the district court’s factual conclusion that—
although the employer’s proffered reasons were pretextual—
discrimination had not been proven.197 Progressive organizations and 
commentators viewed such a “pretext-mandates-judgment” rule as key to 
McDonnell Douglas’s utility, and thus saw the stakes of St. Mary’s Honor 
as being very high.198 
Indeed, many progressives believed that plaintiffs with only 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination would be hard-pressed to win 
their cases without the help of a technical rule that required a ruling in 
favor of the plaintiff when pretext was shown.199 Absent a rule that 
required a finding for the plaintiff upon a showing of pretext, they 
reasoned that plaintiffs would be required to produce “direct” evidence of 
                                                     
195. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
196. Id.; see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717–18 (1983) 
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring). 
197. See Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492–93 (8th Cir. 1992). 
198. See, e.g., William H. Freivogel, Discrimination Law Being Put to the Test Supreme Court 
Reviews Burden of Proof, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 1993, at 01B, 1993 WLNR 601741; 
see also infra notes 208–211 and accompanying text (NAACP view in briefing); infra notes 219–223 
and accompanying text (reactions during and after the fact).  
199. See infra notes 200–201, and accompanying text. Note that part of this concern arose from the 
occasional conflation—on both sides—of the question of whether plaintiffs could prove the factual 
question of discrimination by proving the employer’s LNDR false with the question of whether 
proving the employer’s LNDR false compelled a finding of discrimination. See, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. 
at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting). This issue was ultimately resolved by the Court’s unanimous decision 
in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), holding that a permissive, but 
not mandatory, inference of discrimination arises from a finding of pretext.  
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discrimination or to disprove any possible employer reason “lurking in the 
record.”200 Although neither was a necessary consequence of a factual 
approach to McDonnell Douglas, both were perceived as such by many 
progressives—with some reason.201 And because explicit proof of bias 
was rare and disproving all possible reasons was potentially impractical, 
progressives perceived the court of appeals’ rule as of vital importance. 
But Melvyn Hicks’s own case arguably was a poor vehicle for 
addressing this set of concerns. Hicks himself had highly persuasive 
evidence of discrimination that extended far beyond proof that the 
employer’s reason was false.202 Indeed, there was a virtual smoking gun 
in Hicks’s case: an internal memorandum in which the author explicitly 
opined that there were too many African Americans employed in positions 
of authority at the facility where Hicks worked.203 In the three years that 
followed, Hicks and nearly every other African American supervisor were 
removed from positions of authority at the facility and replaced by white 
employees.204 At trial, Hicks proved that the facility’s proffered 
explanation for firing him was false, and there was no support in the 
record for any alternative explanation but race discrimination.205 Thus, 
while there were clear flaws in the district court’s opinion ruling against 
Melvyn Hicks, they most obviously resided in the court’s factual 
conclusion (finding no race discrimination in the face of highly damning 
evidence), not its refusal to be bound by a finding of pretext alone.206 
But because of the posture of the case—and because the court of 
appeals’ ruling was perceived as an important one to preserve—virtually 
none of the argument by progressives at the Supreme Court focused on 
                                                     
200. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Melvin Hicks at 25–37, St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502 (1993) (No. 92-602) (plaintiff’s brief, authored by the NAACP) [hereinafter Hicks 
Respondent’s Brief]; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533–38 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
201. The majority decision in St. Mary’s Honor was arguably somewhat ambiguous on both of 
these issues, though its predominant argument—that discrimination is a factual question—was 
inconsistent with a rigid rule on either front. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533–38 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
The Court ultimately clarified this ambiguous language in Reeves, holding that proof that an 
employer’s proffered LNDR is false is sufficient (without more) for a fact-finder to find 
discrimination, though it does not require such a finding. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.  
202. See infra notes 203–204 and accompanying text. 
203. See Hicks Respondent’s Brief, supra note 200, at 2–3. 
204. Id. 
205. See Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1251–52 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (finding the 
defendant’s LNDR was proven false, but reasoning without evidence that the crusade to fire him 
might have been “personally” rather than “racially” motivated). Cf. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 
90 F.3d 285, 290 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996) (on remand, noting that both of the decision-makers testified in 
post-remand depositions that they lacked personal animus towards Hicks).  
206. See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text. 
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the impropriety of the district court’s factual holding.207 Eschewing any 
argument that the district court’s factual conclusion was clearly 
erroneous, the LDF, arguing for the plaintiff, focused its brief virtually 
exclusively on defending the technical rule that the circuit court had 
adopted.208 Indeed, the LDF strongly defended the position that a finding 
of pretext, standing alone, demanded judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.209 
Using a flow chart to illustrate its position, the LDF contended that there 
were only two reasons “in the case”—discrimination and the employer’s 
LNDR.210 As a result, once the plaintiff had proven the employer’s LNDR 
false, the only reason remaining “in the case” was discrimination, and the 
plaintiff was entitled to win.211 
Internally, the Justices divided along what were—by now—predictable 
lines. Reasoning that the employer should be in no better position from 
lying than they would be from silence, the liberals argued that McDonnell 
Douglas required a finding for the plaintiff where the employer’s LNDR 
was proven false.212 While acknowledging that Aikens—with its focus on 
the factual question of discrimination—seemed to counsel otherwise, the 
liberal Justices suggested that it should not control here.213 The conservative 
Justices also followed their (by now) well-established approach to 
McDonnell Douglas, contending that the circuit court’s technical rule was 
inconsistent with both Burdine and Aikens and must be reversed.214 
It was the vision of the conservative Justices that prevailed. Writing for 
the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the notion that a finding of pretext 
compels judgment in favor of the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff has not 
persuaded the fact-finder of discrimination.215 Opining that “[w]e have no 
authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory 
employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines . . . that 
the employer has unlawfully discriminated,” the majority rejected the 
notion that McDonnell Douglas required otherwise.216 Characterizing the 
                                                     
207. See, e.g., infra notes 209–212, 219–222. 
208. See Hicks Respondent’s Brief, supra note 200, at 13–36. 
209. See generally id. 
210. Id. at 8, 18. 
211. Id. at 8, 13–18. 
212. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Handwritten Notes (St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks) (Apr. 17, 
1993), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 625; Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks) (Apr. 23, 1993), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 625. 
213. See sources cited supra note 212. 
214. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks) (Apr. 23, 
1993), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 625. 
215. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993). 
216. Id. at 514.  
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McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a mere “procedural device,” the majority 
emphasized that cases like Aikens required that the focus at all times must 
be on the factual question of discrimination.217 The Court concluded by 
reiterating Aikens’s view that—whatever role McDonnell Douglas may 
play in the “modes and orders and proof”—discrimination is a factual 
question that must be treated like other questions of fact.218 
In contrast, in dissent, the liberal Justices strongly resisted the 
characterization of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a mere 
procedural device to aid in the resolution of the factual question of 
discrimination. Characterizing the majority as “cast[ing] aside” the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, the dissent described the framework as 
one in which the parties must proceed through a rigid series of technical 
stages to the ultimate question of whether the employer’s reason was 
pretextual.219 Rather than focusing on the factual question of 
discrimination, the dissent opined instead that the paradigm should be 
understood as “narrow[ing]” the issue at Step Three to the issue of 
pretext.220 The dissent thus characterized McDonnell Douglas as a set of 
technical legal rules, not ultimately subservient to a factual assessment of 
whether discrimination took place.221 Decrying the majority’s decision to 
hold otherwise, the dissent predicted that the majority’s approach would 
“greatly disfavor[]” plaintiffs with only circumstantial proof.222 
In its aftermath, progressives—like the Court’s liberal Justices—
widely decried St. Mary’s Honor, characterizing it as an “abandonment of 
civil rights remedies.”223 But, unlike earlier controversial Title VII 
decisions from the Rehnquist Court, no successful movement for 
congressional override ever materialized.224 As a result, the vision of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm embraced by St. Mary’s Honor (and in the 
                                                     
217. Id. at 518–21. 
218. Id. at 514, 524–25. 
219. Id. at 526–30 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
220. Id. at 529–30, 529 n.2. 
221. Id. at 526–30. 
222. Id. at 534. 
223. Editorial, New Direction for the NAACP, BOS. GLOBE, July 19, 1993, at 10; see, e.g., Herman 
Schwartz, The Supreme Court Stays Hard Right., NATION, Oct. 25, 1993, at 452, 1993 WL 5139493 
(characterizing St. Mary’s Honor as “intellectually dubious” and as a part of a conservative campaign to 
judicially retrench civil rights); Viewpoints, Overburdened; The Supreme Court Has Made it too 
Difficult to Prove Bias. The Congress Must Act., NEWSDAY, July 1, 1993, at 54, 1993 WLNR 393855 
(describing the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Mary’s Honor as “having overturned established civil 
rights law” and “ma[d]e it more difficult, if not downright impossible, for employees to win bias suits”). 
224.  See generally McGinley, supra note 4, at 203–06 (describing the substantial attention paid to 
certain other overridden Supreme Court decisions). 
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two decades of opinions that preceded it) continues to control today. 
Contrary to the hopes of progressives in the 1980s—but, as set out below, 
very much of potential utility to plaintiffs today—McDonnell Douglas is, 
under controlling precedent, no more than a procedural device. 
Ultimately, it is the factual question of discrimination that must control, 
rather than any technical rules engrafted on it. As such, under St. Mary’s 
Honor, there is no authority for the courts to impose rigid legal rules—on 
either party—under the rubric of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. 
III. IMPLICATIONS: TAKING ST. MARY’S HONOR SERIOUSLY 
St. Mary’s Honor marked the end point of the first technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm—that burdening defendants.225 But even as St. Mary’s 
Honor was being decided, already the lower courts had begun to turn 
toward a new, anti-plaintiff version of the paradigm.226 Today, technical 
rules are just as widespread as they were before St. Mary’s Honor.227 But 
they almost exclusively burden plaintiffs, not defendants.228 Just as during 
the era of the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, such rules are 
often applied in ways that effectively supplant the factual question of 
discrimination.229 Thus, just like forty years ago, it is common for 
McDonnell Douglas cases to be resolved in the lower courts on technical 
rather than factual grounds. 
Debates regarding the propriety of this new anti-plaintiff iteration of 
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm often appear to assume that 
the lower courts write on a clean slate in its adoption. But they do not. 
From its inception, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm generated disputes 
regarding whether its associated technical rules should be permitted to 
distract from the ultimate factual question of discrimination—and the 
Supreme Court consistently and repeatedly held that they should not.230 
These disputes were long fought, deeply divisive, and fully debated on the 
Court.231 In deciding St. Mary’s Honor and the many cases that preceded 
                                                     
225. As noted, supra note 48, there are a few ways that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm could be 
characterized as still disadvantaging defendants via technical rules. But most of these have little actual 
relevance in practice. 
226. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 4, at 229–33 (writing just prior to St. Mary’s Honor that the 
lower courts were using the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in technical ways to defeat plaintiffs’ 
claims at summary judgment). 
227. See supra Part I. 
228. See supra Part I. 
229. See supra Part I. 
230. See supra Part II. 
231. See supra Part II. 
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it, the Court made a clear choice for a factually focused, non-technical version 
of the paradigm, instead of one under which technical rules may control.232 
Many of these cases addressed defendant-burdening technical rules that 
are virtually indistinguishable from the technical rules that plague 
plaintiffs in the lower courts today. For example, St. Mary’s Honor itself 
held that a defendant’s liability does not turn on pretext, because the 
factual question of discrimination is the ultimate issue in a McDonnell 
Douglas case—and yet some lower courts today treat a plaintiff’s failure 
to prove pretext as fatal to their claims.233 So, too, cases like Furnco 
Construction Corp. v. Waters,234 Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, and McDonnell Douglas itself rejected the idea that technical 
rules could render certain defendants’ proof or arguments off-limits—and 
yet plaintiffs find their proof and arguments ignored under a host of 
technical circuit rules.235 St. Mary’s Honor, Aikens, Furnco, MacDonald, 
and others held that technical holdings are not McDonnell Douglas’s 
ultimate focus—and that defendants should win—or lose—based on the 
factual question of discrimination.236 And yet, today, these admonitions 
are too often ignored by judges who treat the bottom-line factual 
question—of whether the plaintiff’s evidence, taken as a whole, could 
support a finding of discrimination—as largely irrelevant.237 
There is no reason why this double standard should be acceptable. The 
                                                     
232. See supra Part II; see also Malamud, supra note 4, at 2273–74 (making a similar observation). 
233. See sources cited supra note 58. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518–19, 524 (1993). 
234. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
235. See sources cited supra notes 59, 63–65. Cf. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577–80 (rejecting the Court of 
Appeals’ refusal to treat as an adequate LNDR an employer reason that did not maximize consideration 
of minority applicants and also holding the Court of Appeals erred in applying a categorical rule to 
disallow consideration of the employer’s statistical evidence in an individual disparate treatment case); 
Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256–57, 257 n.11 (1981) (rejecting Court of 
Appeals rule that had required the defendant to “persuad[e] the court that it had convincing, objective 
reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above the plaintiff”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 803–04 (1972) (criticizing the circuit court for suggesting that the employer’s reason was 
entitled to “little weight” as a subjective, rather than objective reason). 
236. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 518–19, 524 (holding that the factual question of 
discrimination, not pretext, is the ultimate question in a McDonnell Douglas case); U.S. Postal Serv. 
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714–16 (1983) (District Court erred in focusing on the 
prima facie case as dispositive once the employer came forward with LNDR, and should have focused 
on the ultimate factual question of discrimination); Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576–78 (noting that “[t]he 
central focus of the inquiry [in a McDonnell Douglas case] is always whether the employer is treating 
‘some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin’” 
and holding that the Circuit Court’s focus on whether the employer’s LNDR would adequately allow 
inclusion of minorities was inappropriate); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 
282–84 (1976) (holding that “all racial discrimination in employment” is prohibited by Title VII, and 
that the seriousness of the plaintiff’s offense was not dispositive if disparate treatment had occurred). 
237. See sources cited supra notes 7, 57–58, 60–62. 
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rationale underlying St. Mary’s Honor, Aikens, and many of the cases that 
preceded them is that ultimately the question in a McDonnell Douglas 
case is a factual one: was the adverse treatment of the plaintiff “because 
of” race, sex, or another protected class status?238 Those cases, moreover, 
hold that McDonnell Douglas is a mere “procedural device” designed to 
aid in this inquiry—and that where technical rules associated with it 
distract from the factual question, it is the technical rules that must 
recede.239 While this reasoning was devised primarily in the context of 
defendant-burdening technical rules, it equally demands that plaintiffs be 
unburdened by the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm today. If the 
courts “have no authority to impose liability upon an employer” based on 
judge-made technical rules (as opposed to a fact-finder determination of 
discrimination), surely they equally have no authority to absolve an 
employer of liability where a fact-finder determination of discrimination 
could be sustained.240 
And indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court has had the opportunity 
to address the “second technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm,” it has 
proven no more favorable to it than the first.241 For example, in the 2000 
case of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, the Court—again 
unanimous—rejected the lower court’s opinion granting JMOL to the 
defendant on the basis of a succession of technical circuit court rules.242 
                                                     
238. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 518–19, 524 (emphasizing that the ultimate question 
in a McDonnell Douglas case is the factual question of whether the employee was treated differently 
because of his protected class status); Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715–16 (same); see generally supra Part II. 
239. See sources cited supra note 238. 
240. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993). 
241. See infra notes 242–245 and accompanying text; Sprint v. Mendelsohn, 522 U.S. 379, 387–
88 (2008) (in a pretext/McDonnell Douglas case, holding that evidence of discrimination against 
other, non-plaintiff employees should be evaluated for admissibility on an individualized basis under 
Rules 401 and 403, and not subject to per se rules); cf. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235, 
2250–51 (2019) (in the context of a Batson challenge, holding that the lower court erred in not 
assessing the question of discrimination in light of “all the facts and circumstances”). Note that Young 
v. UPS is an exception to the general trend on the Court toward rejection of technical McDonnell 
Douglas approaches, since it endorses a technical variant on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm—one 
benefitting plaintiffs—for some Pregnancy Discrimination Act claims. See Young v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). However, the Court has made clear that Young is 
limited to a narrow context—claims under the PDA (and, possibly, even further to accommodation 
claims under the “similar in their ability or inability to work” clause). Id. at 1355; but cf. Deborah L. 
Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified Impact to Disparate 
Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 600 (2017) (noting the illogic of the Court’s 
attempt to cabin Young to the PDA context). The lower courts have generally resisted efforts to expand 
Young beyond the PDA context. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt., 852 F.3d 1018, 1025–26 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
242. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying the 
stray remarks doctrine, as well as a number of other technical circuit rules, to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
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In 2002, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 243 the Court rejected the Second 
Circuit’s technical rule requiring the pleading of a McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case. And in 2006, in Ash v. Tyson Foods,244 the Supreme 
Court reversed another technical lower court opinion, reasoning that the 
circuit court’s rigid legal rules were “unhelpful” to evaluating the 
plaintiff’s claims of discrimination.245 
In each of these cases, the lower courts dismissed potentially viable 
discrimination claims based on exactly the type of anti-plaintiff technical 
rules that now pervade application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
(including, for example, stray remarks, rigid rules for considering 
comparative qualifications, rigid application of the stages of the 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, and others).246 And in each, the Supreme 
Court rejected the lower courts’ rigid and decontextualized approach.247 
Most explicitly in Reeves, but implicitly in all of these cases, the Court 
reaffirmed that the inquiry in the McDonnell Douglas context is ultimately 
a factual one: was the plaintiff subjected to discrimination?248 Thus, even 
                                                     
evidence and find that JMOL was appropriate), rev’d, 530 U.S. 133, 150–53 (2000) (overturning the lower 
court’s award of JMOL and criticizing its slicing and dicing of the plaintiffs’ evidence under technical circuit 
rules); Zimmer, supra note 6, at 585–86, 589–92 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves). 
243. 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002). 
244. 546 U.S. 454 (2006). 
245. See id. at 457; Ash v. Tyson Foods, 129 F. App’x 529, 533–34 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying a 
series of technical circuit rules to individually divide and reject the plaintiff’s evidence on JMOL). 
246. See, e.g., Reeves, 197 F.3d at 692–94 (applying the “stray remarks” doctrine to ignore age-
biased comments, because those comments “were not made in the direct context of Reeves’s 
termination”); Ash, 129 F. App’x at 532–34 (applying a host of hyper-technical circuit rules to uphold 
JMOL, including circuit rules limiting relevant qualifications evidence to only that which 
demonstrated a “disparity . . . so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face”); 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 5 F. App’x 63, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring the plaintiff to plead a 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of discrimination). 
247. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–53; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–12; Ash, 546 U.S. at 455–58. 
248. In Reeves, the Court’s unanimous opinion repeatedly reiterates throughout that the bottom-
line question in a McDonnell Douglas case is a factual one, and thus must be treated as such at JMOL. 
See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000) (observing that 
the Court held in St. Mary’s Honor that the fact-finder’s role in a McDonnell Douglas case is 
ultimately to decide whether the “employer intentionally discriminated” and that pretext evidence can 
be a basis for that factual conclusion, thought it does not compel that conclusion); id. at 148 (making 
clear that because discrimination “should not [be] treat[ed] . . . differently from other ultimate 
questions of fact,” each individual McDonnell Douglas case must be evaluated in light of all of the 
facts and circumstances to determine if JMOL is appropriate); id. at 153 (treating the ultimate question 
in a McDonnell Douglas case as the factual question of whether the defendant “intentional[ly] 
discriminated” and holding that the Circuit Court erred in “substitut[ing] its judgment concerning the 
weight of the evidence for the jury’s”). In Swierkiewicz, the Court reaffirmed that the bottom-line 
question in a discrimination case is whether the plaintiff was terminated “on account” of his protected 
class status, and that that should thus be the relevant benchmark against which a motion to dismiss is 
evaluated. See Swierkiewiecz, 534 U.S. at 514; see also id. at 511–12 (noting that the McDonnell 
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as the lower courts have shifted towards plaintiff-unfavorable technical 
approaches, the Supreme Court has adhered to its vision of the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm as a procedural vehicle that may not distract from Title 
VII’s fundamentally factual bottom-line.249 
But these Supreme Court holdings have had little effect. To date, most 
attacks on the plaintiff-unfavorable revival of the technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm have not taken place in the Supreme Court, but in the lower 
courts. And, such attacks have ordinarily taken the form of individualized 
critiques of the application of specific technical rules.250 In a world in which 
scores of cases each year are dismissed under an ever-varying configuration 
of technical McDonnell Douglas rules, these challenges have failed to 
meaningfully affect the lower courts’ hyper-technical approach.251 Even 
where (as described above) the Supreme Court itself has reversed lower court 
decisions applying the new technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, it has 
done so without critiquing the broader phenomenon.252 As such, many lower 
courts have paid scant attention, continuing to apply the very doctrines 
repudiated by the Court.253 
But the history recounted herein suggests that a more global approach 
is both warranted and feasible.254 While the technical approaches that 
                                                     
Douglas prima facie case is supposed to be flexible and that plaintiffs can prove discrimination in a 
variety of ways). And in Ash, the court held that uncontextualized legal rules could not provide the 
answer to whether the plaintiff’s evidence was probative of discrimination. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 456 
(noting that no per se rule could be stated regarding whether the use of the term “boy” was evidence 
of discrimination, and discussing the many contextual factors that might affect whether it was 
probative of bias); id. at 457–58 (criticizing the circuit court’s rigid rule for when comparative 
qualifications are probative and declining to articulate an alternative standard). 
249. See sources cited supra note 248. 
250. The most obvious extant basis on which plaintiffs could challenge the technical McDonnell 
Douglas would be to urge the adoption of the Eleventh (and formerly Seventh) Circuits’ “convincing 
mosaic” standard. But a search of trial court and court of appeals briefs shows only a handful of 
references to the standard in circuits other than the Seventh and Eleventh. See Westlaw Court of 
Appeals Briefs and Trial Documents Databases (search for “convincing mosaic”), 
https://www.westlaw.com/SharedLink/da9bdcdca3d5483fb484badf76e9a6f2?VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
251. See generally sources cited supra note 10. 
252. See sources cited supra notes 242–245. 
253. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 207 (detailing the continued application of the stray 
remarks doctrine after Reeves and Tyson); Zimmer, supra note 6, at 592–600 (documenting the lower 
courts’ failure to meaningfully retreat from the their technical approach to McDonnell Douglas after 
Reeves); Ash v. Tyson, 190 F. App’x 924 (11th Cir. 2006) (on remand, reaching the same conclusion, 
and relying on very similar technical reasoning). Note that this is not all that different from the first 
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, where it took many years, and many cases for the lower 
courts to abandon some of their rules limiting, for example, the types of employer reasons or evidence 
that could be considered. See supra Part IIA. 
254. See generally infra notes 255–266 and accompanying text. 
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infect McDonnell Douglas today vary in form and by circuit, any decision 
that privileges technical legal rules over the search for the factual question 
of discrimination is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings.255 
This is true of cases that decisively apply a rigid formulation of the prima 
facie case256; that require a showing of pretext in the sense of falsity (even 
in the presence of other evidence of discrimination)257; that disregard 
plaintiff evidence for a host of technical reasons258; that give dispositive 
weight to employer evidence which is, as a matter of fact, only partially 
relevant259; and more.260 While each of these technical rules takes a 
different form, they all suffer from the same flaw: they seek to privilege a 
technical legal rule over the search for the factual question of whether 
discrimination took place.261 Just as the Court spent decades repudiating such 
technical rules where they burden defendants, so too their current plaintiff-
burdening iterations must fall. Ultimately, while the structure of McDonnell 
Douglas remains, the Supreme Court has admonished that it must not distract 
from the fundamentally factual question of discrimination.262 
Some circuits’ case law—most notably the Seventh and the Eleventh—
provide models for what a McDonnell Douglas paradigm shorn of its 
technical rules might look like. For example, the Seventh Circuit has 
reminded us that the relevant question in a Title VII case “is simply 
                                                     
255. See supra Part II. 
256. See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232–33 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (in a case in 
which the plaintiff’s supervisor called her a “stupid bitch,” stated directly that he would “never . . . send a 
female to the [Police] Academy” and sexually harassed his subordinates, applying a rigid version of the 
prima facie case to conclude that the plaintiff had not even made out a prima facie case of discrimination), 
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
257. See, e.g., Youry v. Exec. Transp. Co., 2013 WL 4774447, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013) (in 
a case in which the decisionmaker had referred to the plaintiff as a “black bastard,” and told the 
plaintiff “I never liked you black Haitians” shortly before terminating him, defining pretext at Step 
Three of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as exclusively focused on showing that the reason given 
by the employer lacks factual support, and dismissing the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim for 
failure to prove pretext). 
258. See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 222–24 (5th Cir. 2001) (in a case in which 
the plaintiff’s supervisor stated directly that plaintiff was terminated because “she’s been pregnant three 
times in three years,” affirming an award of JMOL on the grounds that this and other statements were “stray 
remarks” under the circuit’s doctrine and thus “not evidence of intentional discrimination”). 
259. See, e.g., Maybin v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 343 F. Supp. 3d 988, 994–98 (D. Hawaii 
2018) (in a case in which the plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly commented that the plaintiff and other 
older sales managers “were too slow, can’t learn, have a different way of doing things, are hard to 
teach new ways of sales, are too old to change, and don’t have the energy necessary for sales,” holding 
that the plaintiff’s claim must fail because the so-called “the same actor inference” prevented an 
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whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude 
that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor 
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.”263 Similarly, 
the Eleventh Circuit (and previously the Seventh) has suggested that a 
plaintiff ought to prevail if they can demonstrate a “convincing mosaic of 
circumstantial evidence”—irrespective of the technical twists and turns of 
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.264 
Though the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have cast their approaches 
as alternatives to McDonnell Douglas, their inquiries could as easily be 
cast as the fundamental question that a court ought to ask in a McDonnell 
Douglas case. Thus, a court considering whether a plaintiff had made out a 
prima facie case could not grant summary judgment or JMOL if, in the final 
accounting, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s protected class 
status was a “but-for cause.”265 So too, a court considering whether to award 
summary judgment or JMOL on the basis of Step Three would simply 
canvass the evidence as a whole, asking whether it would truly be impossible 
for a reasonable jury to find discrimination. While the insights at the core of 
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm would remain relevant—most notably that 
pretextual arguments by a defendant can cause us to suspect guilt—the 
paradigm itself would no longer take precedence over the facts.266 
But although the case law of the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits may 
provide a model for how a McDonnell Douglas paradigm unburdened by 
technical rules might be formulated, it also provides a cautionary tale. In 
both the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits, the technical rules originally 
engrafted onto McDonnell Douglas have in some cases simply migrated 
to the courts’ application of the new nominally non-technical approach.267 
                                                     
263. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). 
264. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011); see also id. 
(alternatively stating the standard as that the plaintiff should survive summary judgment “so long as 
the circumstantial evidence raises a reasonable inference that the employer discriminated . . . .”). The 
Seventh Circuit was the circuit that originated the “convincing mosaic” approach, but has since 
repudiated it, at least insofar as it is treated as a legal standard. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764–65.  
265. Some case law already takes essentially this approach. See, e.g., Piviorotto v. Innovative Sys., 
Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 356–57 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the bottom-line standard for the prima facie 
case should be whether the plaintiff introduced “evidence adequate to create an inference that an 
employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion”).  
266. Cf. SPERINO, supra note 4, at 333–34 (making a similar suggestion). 
267. See, e.g., Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2018) (after noting the circuit’s 
non-technical approach, applying technical rules drawn from the McDonnell Douglas context to 
dismiss plaintiff’s claims); Khowaja v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2018) (same); El-Saba v. 
Univ. of S. Ala., 738 F. App’x 640 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying technical rules from the McDonnell 
Douglas context even though the plaintiff had only argued under the “convincing mosaic” standard 
and treating them as dispositive of the “convincing mosaic” argument). 
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In other cases, courts have noted the circuit’s bottom-line non-technical 
alternative and yet have not performed any meaningful independent 
analysis.268 Thus, any effort to refocus McDonnell Douglas on the 
ultimate factual question of discrimination—and strip it of its technical 
rules—will no doubt face challenges and will require vigilance in 
demanding that the inquiry be factual in nature.269 Ultimately, 
implementing a truly non-technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm will 
require a fundamental shift in perspective from the lower courts—
recognizing that decades of technical circuit authority has no relevance to 
the inherently individualized factual question of whether this plaintiff was 
subjected to discrimination.270 
It may be difficult for some to envision what such a non-technical 
inquiry into the factual question of discrimination might look like—or to 
conceive that it is indeed possible for courts to apply such an inquiry. But 
in fact, as scholars such as Professors Sandra Sperino and Suzanne 
Goldberg have observed, anti-discrimination law already includes a large 
number of contexts in which courts conduct such a direct, factually 
                                                     
268. See, e.g., Smith v. Thomasville Georgia, 753 F. App’x 675, 689–91, 693–98 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(dismissing most of the plaintiffs’ claims in a technical McDonnell Douglas analysis—noting the 
“convincing mosaic” standard only in a footnote, and not affording it independent analysis); see also 
Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2018) (after noting the Seventh 
Circuit’s bottom-line standard, proceeding to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis, and finding that 
the plaintiffs had not made out a prima facie case on virtually all claims, applying a rigid comparator 
standard, and not looking globally at the plaintiffs’ evidence). 
269. Cf. Malamud, supra note 4, at 2324 (noting the possibility that a doctrine focused just on the 
ultimate issue of discrimination could itself attract additional technical rules to allow the circuit courts 
to superintend the decisions of district courts). 
270. Some might dispute this contention, arguing that these technical circuit rules are relevant to 
the factual question of discrimination, since—if they are conceived of as permissive inferences—they 
do bear some relationship to that factual question. For example, it may genuinely be less likely that 
discrimination took place if the same supervisor hired and fired a plaintiff or if the plaintiff lacks a 
close comparator. But as set out supra in notes 68–71 and accompanying text, that is not how such 
rules are ordinarily applied in practice, and to the extent they are so applied, they do not fall within 
my definition of a “technical” rule, see supra note 9. Perhaps more importantly, however, I contend 
that despite its intuitive appeal, there is little such case law can tell us factually in any individual case, 
since the infinite variety of surrounding facts and circumstances will inevitably mean that the 
significance of any particular circumstances is inherently contingent. For example, consider the case 
of a supervisor who hires an attractive woman, makes bigoted remarks behind her back, consistently 
suggests that she ought to wear short skirts and loosen up, and then fires her. Does the fact that the 
same supervisor hired and fired the woman make it any less likely that she was subject to 
discrimination? The folly of many of the technical rules that the lower courts have adopted is to 
imagine that the presence of some factor (for example, the same supervisor hiring and firing) has the 
same meaning in all cases, or that the courts can possibly catalog all of the surrounding considerations 
that might affect how it is interpreted in light of all of the unique evidence of the case. Cf. Aman v. 
Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that “[a] play cannot be 
understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a 
discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario”). 
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focused inquiry.271 As described above, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
already have alternative models to McDonnell Douglas that—while not 
perfectly applied in every case—permit plaintiffs to proceed with a far 
more direct, factually focused approach to disparate treatment cases.272 So 
too in harassment and stereotyping cases, federal courts across the country 
approach the question of whether disparate treatment was “because of” 
protected class status directly, without the aid of a host of technical 
rules.273 The “motivating factor” and “direct evidence” approaches are 
also contexts in which the courts proceed far more directly to the factual 
question of discrimination, without the aid of technical rules.274 Finally, in 
many circuits, use of McDonnell Douglas is primarily or exclusively restricted 
to summary judgment (and sometimes also JMOL), with the inquiry at other 
procedural stages taking a more direct, factually focused cast.275 
This, of course, suggests that such a factual, non-technical approach should 
be equally plausible in the McDonnell Douglas context. But even if such a 
non-technical approach to McDonnell Douglas is indeed possible, one might 
reasonably ask whether it is sensible. After all, it is unclear what purpose 
remains for the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in a world where its structure 
and associated rules may not distract from the factual question of 
discrimination.276 Indeed, it may seem almost inherently contradictory to 
suggest that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm should continue to exist—but 
effectively have no binding force. Why would we retain the edifice of 
                                                     
271. See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 779–81; Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 261–71. 
272. See supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text. 
273. See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 779–81; Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 261–71. 
274. See Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 265–67. Of course, the courts 
apply rigid technical rules to gatekeep entry into the direct evidence approach, with the result that 
direct evidence claims are virtually never permitted. See supra note 73. Motivating factor cases are 
also much less common than McDonnell Douglas claims at least in part because the Supreme Court 
has held that some protected classes do not have access to them. See id.; Gross v. FBL Fin., 557 U.S. 
167 (2009); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Texas, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). There also are ongoing 
debates among plaintiff-side employment discrimination practitioners about whether it is ever 
desirable to present motivating factor claims to a jury, in view of the risk that the jury will “split the 
baby” and award no relief to the client under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(b). See generally 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) (2012) (on a motivating factor claim, if the employer proves they would have 
taken the same action anyways, the client cannot receive any individualized relief).  
275. See Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 261–65, 269; SPERINO & 
THOMAS, supra note 4, at 174 (observing that “[w]hen cases go to the jury, juries are not instructed 
on many of these frameworks,” and arguing that “[i]f juries do not need to use many of the 
frameworks . . . judges should not need them either”). 
276. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the majority’s rejection of a requirement that a finding of pretext compel judgment 
for the plaintiff as having turned the McDonnell Douglas paradigm into a “misleading and potentially 
useless ritual”). 
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McDonnell Douglas but give it no real meaning? 
And indeed, it may well be that the time has come to question the utility 
of McDonnell Douglas itself.277 As other scholars and judges have 
suggested, replacing McDonnell Douglas with a straightforward inquiry 
into the factual question of discrimination is one possible response to the 
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm—and perhaps the most sensible 
one.278 Divested of any ability for its structure or associated rules to 
interfere with the ultimate factual question of discrimination, it may be 
that no meaningful role for the McDonnell Douglas paradigm remains. 
But one need not go so far to address the plaintiff-unfavorable technical 
approach to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm that many lower courts 
currently embrace. One need not call upon the courts to abandon the 
paradigm in order to argue that it cannot be applied in rigid and technical 
ways. One need not claim plaintiffs can proceed outside the paradigm to 
point out that its focus must always remain the ultimate factual question 
of discrimination. Just as defendants succeeded in persuading the Court to 
abandon the anti-defendant technical rules that once gave the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm meaning—without ever persuading it to abandon the 
paradigm itself—so too plaintiffs today can do the same. 
This is important because the McDonnell Douglas paradigm is both 
legally well-established and deeply entrenched in anti-discrimination 
practice.279 There are few reasons to believe that it will imminently be 
abandoned, nor does the Supreme Court’s case law provide any obvious 
basis for arguing that it should be abandoned. In contrast, there is ample 
basis under the Supreme Court’s case law for arguing that the set of 
technical rules that burdens plaintiffs—the technical McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm—is impermissible.280 While it may not be possible to entirely 
eliminate the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, there are strong legal 
arguments for why it must be applied equitably while it remains. 
Of course, such equitable application would not eliminate all of the 
many obstacles that stand in the way of discrimination plaintiffs’ success. 
Federal judges’ negative attitudes regarding discrimination cases are well-
                                                     
277. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 4, at 2236–38, 2317–20 (arguing that “the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine proof structure ought to be abandoned”); Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 
supra note 13, at 115–18 (suggesting a much more straightforward alternative to the current 
discrimination frameworks, including McDonnell Douglas); Tymkovich, supra note 5, at 528–29 
(arguing with respect to McDonnell Douglas that “[i]t may now be time to replace the framework 
with a simpler, more direct method of determining the question of discrimination,” focused on the 
sufficiency of the evidence). 
278. See sources cited supra note 277. 
279. See supra Part I. 
280. See supra Part II. 
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documented and no doubt would continue to influence outcomes even 
were the technical McDonnell Douglas eliminated.281 Overuse of 
summary judgment is common across many fields and almost certainly 
would continue to trouble the employment discrimination field.282 Low-
income and minority plaintiffs would continue to struggle to find lawyers, 
and discrimination plaintiffs from some identity groups would continue to 
face adjudicator biases in ways that adversely affect their likelihood of 
success.283 The well-established reluctance of most Americans to interpret 
even compelling facts as discrimination would remain.284 
But there are nevertheless reasons to believe that eliminating the 
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm would make a difference. Most 
judges articulate a belief in following the law, and there is strong evidence 
to suggest that, indeed, the law matters (though other factors do too).285 
Currently that law (as set out in circuit precedent) tells judges that it is 
permissible, or even mandatory, to ignore the factual question of 
discrimination and to find against plaintiffs who fail to jump through a 
series of technical hoops.286 Thus, even judges who are inclined to be 
                                                     
281. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 138–39 (observing that “[this] belief . . . that 
the federal courts are flooded with questionable discrimination cases . . . may affect how judges 
interpret the substance of the law. Indeed, federal judges have been taught how to eliminate 
discrimination cases from their dockets at judicial conferences”); Anand Swaminathan, The Rubric 
of Force: Employment Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases and Judicial Hostility, 3 
MODERN AMERICAN 21, 26 (2007); Special Comm. on Race & Ethnicity, Special Report of the 
Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias, 
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 303–06 (1996); Margaret Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 782, 823–25 (2011). 
282. See, e.g., Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 141 
n.5 (2007) (collecting sources). Scholars have demonstrated especially high rates of summary 
judgment in the context of employment discrimination and other civil rights cases. See id.; Kevin 
Clermont & Stewart Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to 
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 128 (2009) (demonstrating that employment discrimination 
plaintiffs fare worse at summary judgment than other classes of plaintiffs).  
283. See, e.g., BERREY ET AL., supra note 1, at 109–29 (describing the difficulties that minority and 
low-income plaintiffs face in obtaining lawyers, and observing that “racial disparities in 
representation mean that the groups most affected by discrimination may be the least likely to have 
the resources to mount effective challenges in court”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of 
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 705, 709–15 
(2007) (describing research demonstrating that summary judgment was especially likely to be granted 
in employment discrimination cases involving women); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race 
Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 890–96 (2006) (describing the 
particularly dismal success rates in race discrimination lawsuits). 
284. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 10, at 1293–302. 
285.  See David Klein, Law in Judicial Decision-Making at 236–41, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, eds. 2017); Lee Epstein & Jack 
Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 24–25 (2013). 
286. See supra Part I. 
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receptive to discrimination claims may feel constrained to find against 
discrimination plaintiffs, and those who are agnostic will be steered to an 
adverse result. Moreover, because of the highly formalistic way in which 
the inquiry is structured by existing caselaw, such judges may not ever 
ask themselves the question of whether, as a matter of fact, discrimination 
took place—or whether a reasonable jury could so conclude. 
But even for those judges who are strongly committed to the 
perspective that discrimination happens rarely and that most 
discrimination claims are meritless, eliminating the technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm ought to affect some cases. Though scholars have 
identified a wide variety of factors that can affect judicial decision-
making, most judges care about the perceived legitimacy of their decision-
making and about making decisions that are consistent with the law.287 If 
that law clearly said that the McDonnell Douglas inquiry must remain 
focused on the factual question of discrimination— without resort to any 
technical legal rules—then all judges would have greater difficulty 
justifying dismissals of discrimination claims. For stripped of their veneer 
of legal legitimacy, such decisions become far more transparent in their 
normative choices—to ignore compelling evidence of discrimination, and 
ultimately to protect discrimination defendants from having to face 
discrimination claims. 
Moreover, it is important to remember that even small shifts in judicial 
behavior in this area could have a substantial impact by virtue of the very 
large numbers of cases that are affected by the technical McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm. Thousands of discrimination cases are dismissed each 
year at summary judgment, many by courts applying the technical 
McDonnell Douglas paradigm.288 Small shifts in judicial behavior could 
thus plausibly result in dozens, if not hundreds, of discrimination cases 
reaching trial every year.289 Moreover, such increasing enforcement risk 
would no doubt have cumulative effects on employer behavior, leading to 
deterrence results that reach beyond the results in individual plaintiffs’ 
                                                     
287. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
77, 89–90 (2009); sources cited supra note 285. 
288. Through careful empirical work, Professors Ellen Berrey, Robert Nelson, and Laura Beth 
Neilsen have demonstrated that 18% of employment discrimination cases end by virtue of employer-
favorable awards of summary judgment. See BERREY ET AL., supra note 1, at 61 (statistic is inclusive 
of all case outcomes, including settlements). Currently, approximately 15,000 employment 
discrimination cases are filed per year, most of which raise McDonnell Douglas claims. See Pauline 
T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2015); sources cited supra note 1. 
289. If just 1% fewer cases were to terminate via summary judgment, an additional 1500 
discrimination cases would proceed to trial annually. See sources cited supra note 288. 
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cases.290 Ultimately, such deterrence may be the most important outcome 
that could be achieved, as it secures what most people desire, which is to 
be free from discrimination to begin with.291 
Finally, even ignoring the possibility of differences in case outcomes, 
eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm remains 
important. The evisceration of anti-discrimination law’s substantive 
protections that has been wrought by the technical McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm has been largely invisible: to the public, to the Supreme Court, 
and to Congress. The technical McDonnell Douglas provides a veneer of 
legitimacy, founded in innumerable, highly specific technical legal rules 
that even experts have found it difficult to see through. As such, it allows 
to pass as legitimate, individualized, and unimportant what is in reality an 
illegitimate, widespread, and devastating judicial nullification of hard-
fought anti-discrimination rights. Stripping such decisions of their 
technical façade would bring transparency to the pervasive normative 
choices that courts are making to foreclose relief to discrimination 
plaintiffs, even where discrimination may well have occurred. 
And this transparency is important. Any effort to revitalize the 
substantive promise of anti-discrimination law will require the ability to 
persuade others—the courts, Congress, and most fundamentally, the 
public—that there is a genuine problem to be solved. But when the 
problem is obscured by scores of technical, apparently legitimate and 
seemingly unimportant legal rules, this possibility of persuasion becomes 
far more remote. Eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
thus represents an important predicate to the type of broader organizing 
work that anti-discrimination reform requires. 
In short, eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm will 
not solve all of the problems of anti-discrimination law. But it is surely an 
important step forward. And it is a step that existing precedent demands. 
The Supreme Court has held that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm must 
always be tethered—not to a series of talismanic technical rules—but to 
the factual question the statute asks. And that question, for plaintiffs and 
defendants alike, is simply whether the plaintiff was treated differently 
“because of” their protected class status. It is time to bring that question 
back to the center of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. 
                                                     
290. See, e.g., Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Krtizer, Private Enforcement, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 700–03 (2013) (describing the ways that private anti-discrimination 
enforcement can lead to wider deterrence of discrimination).  
291. Cf. Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the Unfinished Business of Formal 
Equality, 125 YALE L.J.F. 1, 9–10 (2015) (noting that for most members of a protected group, 
“antidiscrimination law’s benefits are felt, if at all, in its power to prevent discrimination”). 
05 - Eyer (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  5:52 PM 
2019] THE TECHNICAL MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 1017 
 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm has occupied an 
outsized role in the practice of anti-discrimination law. For the thousands 
of plaintiffs whose claims are channeled into the paradigm, its application 
is the reality of anti-discrimination law’s protections. Today, such 
plaintiffs too often see their compelling evidence of discrimination 
ignored, dismissed, or deemed irrelevant through an endless succession of 
technical rules that the lower courts have engrafted on the doctrine. 
But this hyper-technical approach to McDonnell Douglas contravenes 
what the Supreme Court has told us. In cases like St. Mary’s Honor, 
Aikens, Furnco, and even McDonnell Douglas itself, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly rejected a vision of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm that 
is “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.”292 Rather, the Court has held that 
McDonnell Douglas must act simply as a “procedural device” to assist in 
bringing the court and the parties to the final factual question of 
discrimination.293 Ultimately, that factual question of discrimination, 
while “sensitive and difficult,” may not be “treat[ed] . . . differently from 
other ultimate questions of fact.”294 
These holdings are profoundly inconsistent with the approach of many 
lower courts to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm today. Laden with 
technical rules, applied mechanically, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm 
has become its own talismanic inquiry.295 The factual question of 
discrimination—whether the plaintiff was in fact treated differently 
“because of [their] race, color, religion, sex or national origin”—often 
does not receive meaningful consideration.296 In short, the version of the 
paradigm that predominates in the lower courts is fundamentally at odds 
with the vision the Supreme Court’s precedents embrace. Recognizing 
this inconsistency offers one of the most plausible and potentially 
impactful opportunities to reform anti-discrimination law today. 
 
                                                     
292. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors 
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); see 
also supra notes 106–114 (describing the rejection of technical rules in McDonnell Douglas itself). 
293. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 521, 510–11; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713–16. 
294. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 524; Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). 
295. See supra Part I. 
296. Id. 
